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INTRODUCTION 
Retroactive state tax statutes have been controversial in recent years.  
During its 2016-2017 term the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
two cases that probed the constitutionality of a retroactive state tax 
statute that legislatively reversed the analysis in a state supreme court 
decision.1  One of the two cases was Dot Foods, Inc. v. Dep’t of 
Revenue.2  These determinations followed by one year the Supreme 
Court’s denial of certiorari in a third, similar state tax case,3 and comes 
in the aftermath of several other recent comparable state tax cases — 
almost all of which have been decided in favor of the states.4  
 
 1. The cases were Dot Foods, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 372 P.3d 747 (Wash. 2016), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2156 (2017) and six consolidated cases from the state of Michigan pertaining to the 
Multistate Tax Compact that were filed on behalf of 22 companies: Sonoco Prod. Co. v. Mich. Dep’t of 
Treasury, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017); Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP v. Mich. Dep’t of 
Treasury, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017); Gillette Commer. Operations N. Am. v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 137 
S. Ct. 2157 (2017); Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017); 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017); and DIRECTV Grp. 
Holdings LLC v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017). The petitions in the consolidated 
Michigan cases all derived from the Michigan court of appeals’ decision in Gillette Commer. Operations 
N. Am. v. Dep't of Treasury, 878 N.W.2d 891 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015), rev. denied, 880 N.W.2d 230 
(Mich. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017).  See Amy Hamilton, U.S. Supreme Court Extends 
Deadline for Michigan Response in Retroactivity Cases, STATE TAX TODAY: TAX ANALYSTS (Feb. 3, 
2017), 2017 STT 22-7.  A seventh case that sought to appeal the result in Gillette, R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co. v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 137 S. Ct. 2273 (2017), was denied certiorari by the U.S. 
Supreme Court on June 19, 2017. See Amy Hamilton, U.S. Supreme Court Again Declines to Hear 
Challenge to Michigan Multistate Tax Compact Case, STATE TAX TODAY: TAX ANALYSTS (June 20, 
2017), 2017 STT 117-2.  For a discussion of Gillette and the resulting consolidated Michigan cases, see 
infra notes 363-400 and accompanying text.    
 2. 372 P.3d 747 (Wash. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2156 (2017).  The second “case” was the 
consolidated Michigan cases referenced supra note 1. 
 3. In re Estate of Hambleton, 335 P.3d 398 (Wash. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 318 (2015).   
 4. The other recent state tax cases where a retroactive tax statute reversed a judicial decision 
include:  Caprio v. Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 37 N.E.3d 707, rehearing denied, 38 N.E.3d 817 (2015); 
General Motors Corp. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 803 N.W.2d 698 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010), review denied, 800 
N.W.2d (Mich. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1178 (2012); Zaber v. City of Dubuque, 789 N.W.2d 634 
(Iowa 2010); Miller v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 296 S.W.3d 392 (Ky. 2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 935 
(2010); Jefferson Cty. Comm'n v. Edwards, 49 So.3d 685 (Ala. 2010); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dep’t 
of Treasury, No. 289781, 2010 WL 99050 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (unpublished), review denied, 782 
N.W.2d 771 (Mich. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1178 (2011); GMAC LLC v. Dep’t of Treasury, 781 
N.W.2d 310 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009); King v. Campbell County, 217 S.W.3d 862 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006); 
2
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Frequently, the statute’s arguable period of retroactivity has been 
lengthy.  A broad coalition of interested parties, including several amici, 
supported each of the three recent certiorari petitions, highlighting the 
seeming disconnect between the taxpayer concerns and the Supreme 
Court’s inaction.5  Other commentators have also criticized the results in 
these recent cases.6 
The controlling U.S. Supreme Court precedent with respect to 
retroactive tax legislation is United States v. Carlton.7  Carlton upheld a 
retroactive federal tax statute against a claim that the statute violated the 
Due Process Clause.8  The practitioners seeking certiorari in the recent 
state cases have argued that the courts have misapplied Carlton in 
upholding a retroactive tax statute.9  These practitioners have also 
 
Allegis Realty Inv’rs v. Novak, 860 N.E.2d 246 (Ill. 2006); and Moran Towing Corp. v. Urbach, 1 
A.D.3d 722 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).  In City of Modesto v. Nat'l Med, Inc., the court refused to allow a 
retroactive statute to reverse a judicial decision. 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). The 
reasoning in City of Modesto was later questioned in River Garden Retirement Home v. Franchise Tax 
Bd. 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d 62, 79-81 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). 
 5. For example, in Dot Foods amicus briefs were filed by the Council on State Taxation 
(“COST”), the Tax Executives Institute, Inc. (“TEI”), the Institute for Professionals in Taxation (“IPT”) 
and the American College of Tax Counsel (“ACTC”). See Amy Hamilton, U.S. Supreme Court Asks 
Washington For Response in Dot Foods Retroactivity Case, STATE TAX TODAY: TAX ANALYSTS (Nov. 
7, 2016), 2016 STT 215-2.  COST, TEI and ACTC also filed amicus briefs in the recent, consolidated 
Michigan cases and were joined in those filings by the National Association of Manufacturers. See Brief 
Amicus Curiae of Council on State Taxation in Support of Petitioners, Sonoco Prod. Co. v. Mich. Dep’t 
of Treasury, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017) (No. 16-687), 2016 WL 7438844; Brief for Tax Exec. Inst., Inc. as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Sonoco Prod. Co., v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 137 S. Ct. 2157 
(2017) (No. 16-687), 2016 WL 7423020; Brief of the Am. Coll. of Tax Counsel as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners, Sonoco Prod. Co., v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017) (No. 16-
687), 2016 WL 7473977; Brief for the Nat’l Assoc. of Mfr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Sonoco Prod. Co., v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017) (No. 16-687), 2016 
WL 7451284. COST, TEI and IPT are organizations with significant business memberships. See Brief 
Amicus Curiae of Council on State Taxation in Support of Petitioner at 1, Dot Foods, Inc. v. Dep’t of 
Revenue of Wash., 137 S. Ct. 2156 (2017) (No. 16-308), 2016 WL 5930234 at *1 (“COST represents 
nearly 600 multistate businesses in the United States”); TAX EXECUTIVES INSTITUTE, INC., 
https://www.tei.org/Organization/Pages/about_tei.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2018) (TEI website 
describes that organization as “the preeminent association of in-house tax professionals worldwide” with 
“nearly 7,000 members … representing over 2,800 leading businesses in the United States, Canada, 
Europe, and Asia”); Brief for the Inst. for Prof’ls in Taxation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner 
at 1, Dot Foods, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Wash., 137 S. Ct. 2156 (2017) (No. 16-308), 2016 WL 
5957539 at *1 (“IPT has more than 4,100 members including  … most of the Fortune 500 companies.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Amy Hamilton, Year in Review: Tax Retroactivity, STATE TAX TODAY: TAX 
ANALYSTS (Dec. 30, 2016), 2016 STT 251-6 (quoting commentators); Amy Hamilton, Retroactive State 
Tax Laws Questioned at NYU Conference, 79 STATE TAX NOTES 9 (Jan. 4, 2016) (same); Doug 
Sheppard, Should States be Allowed to Retroactively Change Tax Laws?, 77 STATE TAX NOTES 545 
(Aug. 10, 2015) (same).  
 7. 512 U.S. 26 (1994). 
 8. See id. at 30-35. 
 9. The ACTC states that state courts have been misapplying Carlton and “we do not believe 
that the formulation of the test in Carlton was correctly interpreted and applied to the case at bar.”  Brief 
of the Am. Coll. of Tax Counsel as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 9-10, Dot Foods, Inc. v. 
Dep’t of Revenue of Wash., 137 S. Ct. 2156 (2017) (No. 16-308), 2016 WL 5904959 at *9-10. TEI 
3
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alternatively claimed that the state cases — in particular Dot Foods — 
demonstrate that Carlton needs to be revisited.10 
A review of Carlton is necessary to evaluate the claimants’ 
arguments. Carlton addressed a situation in which Congress first 
conferred a tax incentive — a tax deduction for certain activity 
undertaken by an estate — then, a little over one year later, retroactively 
narrowed this incentive on the theory that its prior breadth was 
mistakenly broad.11  The Supreme Court’s prior cases on retroactive tax 
legislation had been very deferential, on the theory that tax and fiscal 
policy-making is rightfully and ultimately the province of a 
government’s legislative function.12  But the Court’s prior precedent 
arguably did not approve of such statutes where they negatively affected 
taxpayers who had reasonably relied upon pre-existing law and who had 
no notice of any impending change.13  This was particularly so with 
respect to estate and gift tax where three Supreme Court cases from the 
1920’s ruled in favor of a taxpayer.14  The Ninth Circuit, which rendered 
the lower court decision in Carlton, found in favor of an estate that 
sought the deduction, citing the taxpayer’s reasonable reliance and lack 
of notice.15 The Supreme Court reversed, however, and clarified that the 
relevant constitutional test does not focus narrowly on the aggrieved 
taxpayer.16    
Carlton clarified that the applicable due process test evaluates the 
governmental action.  The Court stated: “provided that the retroactive 
application of a statute is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose 
furthered by rational means, judgments about the wisdom of such 
legislation remain within the exclusive province of the legislative and 
executive branches.”17 When this two-part rational basis standard is met, 
as it was in Carlton, the statute “meets the requirements of due 
 
states that taxpayers need guidance “clarifying the boundaries of Carlton.”  Brief for the Tax Exec. Inst., 
Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 22, Dot Foods, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Wash., 137 
S. Ct. 2156 (2017) (No. 16-308), 2016 WL 5957540 at *22. 
 10. The ACTC states that if Dot Foods is correct, “legislatures would have a blank check to 
impose retroactive tax increases upon taxpayers who had relied upon prior law to structure their affairs.”  
Brief of the Am. Coll. of Tax Counsel as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 9, at 4.  
COST states, “Guidance is particularly important in cases such as this one, where legislative action has 
violated principles of fair play and the rule of law.”  Brief Amicus Curiae of Council on State Taxation 
in Support of Petitioner, supra note 5, at 4.   
 11. See 512 U.S. at 28-32. 
 12. See infra notes 68-75. 
 13. See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. 
 15. Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1059-62 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 16. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 33-34. 
 17. Id. at 30-31. 
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process.”18  
Carlton concluded that the statute met the first test because the 
legislation was “neither illegitimate nor arbitrary.”19  Congress “acted to 
correct what it reasonably viewed as a mistake in the original 
[legislation] that would have created a significant and unanticipated 
revenue loss.”20  The statute also met the second test because “Congress 
acted promptly and established only a modest period of retroactivity.”21  
Thus, the legitimate legislative purpose was furthered by a rational 
means.22   
Those critiquing the recent state cases have emphasized the factual 
differences.23  These critics have noted that, unlike in Carlton, the state 
statutes at issue were not enacted to correct a legislative mistake and that 
the periods of retroactivity greatly exceeded Carlton’s one-plus year. 
But Carlton does not hold that the only legitimate purpose for a 
retroactive statute is the correction of a mistake.24 Carlton did suggest 
that the period of retroactivity could be relevant to the rational means 
determination.  But Carlton did not hold that implementation of a 
retroactive tax statute necessarily requires a limited period of 
retroactivity — certainly not one to be evaluated under a bright line rule.  
Rather, Carlton stated that the issue as to a statute’s retroactive length is 
ultimately one that considers not formalistic criteria, but rather the 
statute’s “actual retroactive effect.”25 
One of the virtues of Carlton is that it respects the fact that the 
validity of a retroactive tax statute depends on the specific 
circumstances, which the decided cases reveal are variable.  An 
important factual difference from Carlton in the recent state cases is 
exemplified by Dot Foods.  In Dot Foods, the tax statute that was 
retroactively amended was not obviously infirm when adopted.  It was 
only later understood, in hindsight, that the statute was ambiguous in an 
important respect.  This latent ambiguity later permitted the taxpayer to 
posit an interpretation that the state revenue agency briefly accepted, but 
subsequently disputed.26  The taxpayer’s position ultimately prevailed, 
 
 18. See id. at 32.  
 19. Id. at 31.   
 20. Id. at 32. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 30-33. 
 23. See generally the briefs cited at supra notes 5, 9.   
 24. Any “legitimate public purpose” will suffice. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 30-31. Also, Carlton 
suggests a broad ability on the part of a legislature to revisit or fix pre-existing tax statutes. See infra 
notes 97-100 and accompanying text.   
 25. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 33-34. 
 26. See infra notes 136-160 and accompanying text. 
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5-4, in a state supreme court decision.27 Prior to that time, however, 
state law reflected the revenue agency’s position — which was, for a ten 
year period, stated in a regulation that was twice upheld by the state’s 
lower courts.28   
Seven months after the state supreme court decision in Dot Foods, the 
Washington legislature acted to retroactively correct the statute to 
conform to the revenue agency’s prior interpretation.29  Consequently, 
the actual retroactive effect of the Washington legislation was minimal 
— even though the legislation post-dated the original statute by 27 
years.30 It was in part on this basis that the Washington Supreme Court 
later upheld the retroactive statute.31 
The result in Dot Foods, like that in the other recent state cases, not 
only comports with the flexible Carlton standard, but is consistent with 
the rationale that underlies that standard. It would be problematic if a 
retroactive tax statute could only be retroactive for a short period of time 
as measured from the original enactment of the amended statute.  If that 
were so, a legislature would almost never be able to retroactively 
address the consequences of a questionable court case since — as 
suggested by Dot Foods — it frequently takes many years for a statute 
to be judicially construed.32  And, of course, court interpretations of a 
tax statute are themselves typically retroactive.33  Conversely, Carlton 
was predicated on the theory that tax policy is an essential component of 
fiscal policy, which policy-making ultimately resides with the 
government’s legislative and executive branches.  The Court’s rationale 
would be significantly undermined if a legislature could not address a 
questionable court decision; court decisions can be extremely costly to 
the governmental fisc, as Dot Foods and the recent state tax cases make 
clear.  This concern is especially relevant in the state tax context since 
state governments are required to balance their budgets annually.   
Carlton concluded that the taxpayer in question had “no vested right 
in the Internal Revenue Code,” thus enabling Congress to retroactively 
fix its legislative error.34  The critics of the recent state cases have 
argued that these cases are more suspect than Carlton because state 
legislatures have acted, not to fix a clear error, but rather to overrule a 
 
 27. See generally Dot Foods, 215 P.3d 185 (2009). 
 28. See infra notes 154-178 and accompanying text. 
 29. See infra notes 179-185 and accompanying text. 
 30. See infra notes 239-254 and accompanying text. 
 31. See infra notes 202-212 and accompanying text. 
 32. See generally infra notes 136-178 and accompanying text. 
 33. See generally cases cited supra note 4.   
 34. Carlton v. U.S., 512 U.S. 26, 33 (1994). 
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judicial determination.35  But a court decision construing a tax statute 
confers no additional rights — other than with respect to the taxpayer 
who has prevailed in a final court case.36     
This article proceeds in five sections. The first section discusses 
Carlton, its historical context and its logical implications.  The second 
section considers the history of and analysis in Dot Foods. The third 
section evaluates Dot Foods as compared to Carlton, and considers 
more generally the cases that consider a curative, ratifying statute like 
that in Dot Foods.  The fourth section examines other recent high-profile 
situations in which a state amended a tax statute to reverse the analysis 
in a court case, as in Dot Foods. The fifth section offers some 
concluding thoughts.    
I. UNITED STATES V. CARLTON 
A. The Facts and Procedural Background 
The retroactive legislation in United States v. Carlton pertained to an 
estate tax provision enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986.37  The 
provision, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 2057 (“§ 2057”), applied to an estate 
that filed a timely tax return after the date of the Act, October 22, 
1986.38  It granted a deduction for half the proceeds of “any sale of 
employer securities by the executor of an estate” to “an employee stock 
ownership plan.”39 But it required that to qualify for the deduction, the 
sale of securities had to be made “before the date on which the [estate 
tax] return . . . [was] required to be filed (including any extensions).”40   
Carlton was the executor of an estate for a woman who died almost 
one year prior to the effective date of the Act, September 29, 1985.41  
Her estate tax return was due December 29, 1986, after Carlton had 
obtained a six-month filing extension.42 On December 10, 1986, Carlton 
used estate funds to purchase 1.5 million shares of MCI 
Communications Corporation for $11,206,000, at an average price of 
 
 35. See, e.g., Brief for the Tax Exec. Inst., Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 9, at 2-3, 23 (stating that “[r]etroactive tax legislation is particularly suspect when the legislation 
retroactively overrules a judicial decision” and that “[t]his Court’s intervention is necessary to halt this 
disturbing and shocking trend and reconfirm that due process imposes meaningful constraints on 
retroactive tax legislation, especially when such legislation is necessary to overturn a judicial decision”).   
 36. See generally infra notes 213-217 and 402 and accompanying text. 
 37. 512 U.S. at 28.  
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. (citing § 2057(b)). 
 40. Id. (citing § 2057(c)(1)). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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$7.47 per share.43 Two days later, Carlton sold the MCI stock to the 
MCI employee stock ownership plan (“ESOP”) for $10,575,000, at an 
average price of $7.05 per share.44 Thus, the total sale price was 
$631,000 less than the original purchase price.45 When Carlton filed the 
estate tax return on December 29, 1986, he claimed a deduction under  
§ 2057 of $5,287,000, for half the proceeds of the sale of the stock to the 
MCI ESOP.46 The deduction reduced the estate tax by $2,501,161.47 The 
parties stipulated that Carlton engaged in the MCI stock transactions 
specifically to take advantage of the § 2057 deduction.48 
On January 5, 1987, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) announced 
that, “[p]ending the enactment of clarifying legislation,” it would treat 
the § 2057 deduction as available only to estates of decedents who 
owned the securities immediately before death.49  A bill enacting such 
an amendment to § 2057 was introduced in each chamber of Congress 
on February 26, 1987.50  On December 22, 1987, the amendment to  
§ 2057 was enacted.51 As amended, the statute provided that, to qualify 
for the deduction, the securities sold to an ESOP must have been 
“directly owned” by the decedent “immediately before death.”52  The 
1987 amendment was made effective as if it had been contained in the 
statute as originally enacted in October 1986.53  
The IRS disallowed the deduction claimed by Carlton under § 2057 
on the theory that the MCI stock had not been owned by the decedent 
“immediately before death.”54 Carlton paid the assessed tax deficiency, 
plus interest, filed a claim for refund, and instituted a refund action in 
U.S. District Court.55 He conceded that the estate did not qualify for the 
deduction under the 1987 amendment.56 He argued, however, that 
retroactive application of the 1987 amendment to the estate’s 1986 
transactions violated the Due Process Clause.57 The district court 
rejected his argument and entered summary judgment in favor of the 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 28-29. 
 49. Id. at 29 (citing IRS Notice 87-13, 1987-1 C.B. 432, 442). 
 50. Id. (citing 133 Cong. Rec. 4145 and 4293 (1987)). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. (citing the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10411(a), 
101 Stat. 1330, 1330-432). 
 53. Id. (citing § 10411(b), 101 Stat. at 1330-433). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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United States.58  On appeal, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit 
reversed.59 
The Supreme Court’s review in Carlton ultimately focused on 
whether the analysis to be applied to a retroactive tax statute focuses on 
the governmental action taken or, alternatively, on the impact of that 
action on the affected taxpayer.  The Ninth Circuit noted that the 
Supreme Court’s “modern” precedent was a series of cases where the 
Court had repeatedly affirmed retroactive tax statutes.60  Nonetheless, 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Court’s “harsh and oppressive” test, 
first stated in 1938 in Welch v. Henry61 and then referenced in two later 
Court decisions, allowed lower courts to consider the impact of 
retroactive tax legislation on a taxpayer and to reject such statutes in 
certain instances.62  The Ninth Circuit further noted that three older  
Supreme Court cases, decided in 1927 and 1928, had rejected such 
statutes.63  The three older cases cited by the Ninth Circuit pertained to 
gift and estate taxes, like the tax in Carlton, and thereby suggested that 
retroactive legislation could be particularly harsh and oppressive in the 
gift and estate tax context.64  The Ninth Circuit also relied on Welch v. 
Henry, which distinguished between gift and estate taxes and other types 
of taxes with respect to retroactive tax legislation.65   
 
 58. Id.   
 59. Id. at 29-30 (citing Carlton v. United States, 972 F. 2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1992), rev’d, 512 U.S. 
26 (1994)). 
 60. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1057-58.  
 61. 305 U.S. 134 (1938). 
 62. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1056-57 (referencing Welch, 305 U.S. 134, United States v. Hemme, 
476 U.S. 558 (1986) and United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292 (1981) (per curiam)).  See David 
Burton, The Constitutionality of Retroactive Changes in the Code: United States v. Carlton, 48 TAX 
LAW. 509, 511 n. 13 (1995) (noting that the Ninth Circuit attempted to define “harsh and oppressive,” a 
standard that had not previously been applied to strike down a retroactive tax statute). 
 63. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1055-1057. 
 64. Id. at 1056-1057 (citing Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 
U.S. 142 (1927); Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928)).  The three cases, the so-called “Nichols 
line of cases,” were ones where gifts were made and had vested prior to the time of the enactment of a 
retroactive tax statute imposing a gift tax.  See Robert R. Gunning, Back from the Dead: The Resurgence 
of Due Process Challenges to Retroactive Tax Legislation, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 291, 300-01 (2009).  Prior 
to those cases, the Supreme Court had repeatedly and without exception upheld numerous retroactive 
tax statutes. See, e.g., Untermyer, 276 U.S. at 446-50 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 65. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1058 (discussing Welch, 305 U.S. 134).  Welch reasoned that gift taxes 
are imposed with respect to a voluntary act and that if the donor knew that the tax law would be changed 
the donor would not necessarily undertake the act.  See id. at 1058.  In contrast, the Court noted that a 
tax on the receipt of income is not comparable to a gift tax because a court “cannot assume that 
stockholders would refuse to receive corporate dividends even if they knew that their receipt would later 
be subjected to a new tax or to the increase of an old one.”  See id. (quoting Welch, 305 U.S. at 148); id. 
at 1063 (Norris, J., dissenting) (quoting this same language).  See also Matthew D. Slepkow, 
Resurrecting the Challenge Against Retroactive Estate Tax Legislation: Acquiescing to the Holding of 
United States v. Carlton—Over My Dead Body, 3 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 119, 142-45 (1997) 
(arguing that estate tax deserves heightened retroactivity scrutiny); Pat Castellano, Retroactively Taxing 
9
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In considering the three 1927-1928 Supreme Court cases where 
retroactive tax legislation had been struck down, the Ninth Circuit 
focused on the fact that the taxpayer did not have actual or constructive 
notice that the relevant statute would be amended and also that the 
taxpayer had reasonably relied upon the pre-existing statute.66  The court 
ultimately concluded that a retroactive statute could be impermissibly 
harsh and oppressive in these circumstances, and struck down the 
retroactive statute on that basis.67    
B. The Supreme Court’s Analysis 
In its opinion, the Supreme Court distinguished its three 1927-1928 
cases relied upon by the Ninth Circuit.  It cited six of its subsequent 
cases and stated that “[t]his Court repeatedly has upheld retroactive tax 
legislation against a due process challenge.”68  The Court noted that its 
earlier cases “were decided during an era characterized by exacting 
review of economic legislation under an approach that ‘has long since 
been discarded.’”69  The Court further observed that those prior cases 
did not “stand for the proposition that retroactivity is permitted with 
respect to income taxes, but prohibited with respect to gift and estate 
taxes.”70 
Carlton recognized that the “harsh and oppressive” verbiage that the 
Ninth Circuit extracted from some of the Court’s modern cases71 
suggested that the judicial focus is to be on a taxpayer affected by 
retroactive legislation and not on the government enacting such 
legislation.72 Therefore, the Court clarified and refocused the test.73  The 
 
Done Deals: Are There Limits? 43 KAN. L. REV. 417, 447 (1995) (similar).  
 66. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1059-62.   
 67. Id. 
 68. Carlton v. United States, 512 U.S. 26, 30 (1994) (citing United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 
558 (1986); United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292 (1981); Welch, 305 U.S. 134; United States v. 
Hudson, 299 U.S. 498 (1937); Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15 (1931); Cooper v. United States, 
280 U.S. 409 (1930)). 
 69. Id. at 34.  Subsequent to those earlier cases, the Court’s analysis evolved towards an 
approach favoring “judicial deference to economic legislation” on the theory that “the courts should not 
act as a ‘superlegislature.’” Matthew A. Schwartz, A Critical Analysis of Retroactive Economic 
Legislation: A Proposal for Due Process Revitalization in the Economic Arena, 9 SETON HALL CONST. 
L.J. 935, 981, 982 n.292 (1999) (citing cases).  This approach presumes that the legislature “possesses 
the necessary expertise and competence to enact laws that will maximize social utility.”  Id. at 981.  
 70. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 31. 
 71. Id. at 30 (citing the standard as stated in Welch, 305 U.S. at 147 and later quoted in Hemme, 
476 U.S. at 568-69).  
 72. Id. at 29-30, 33-35. Justice Scalia in his concurrence stated that a harsh and oppressive test 
lacks “precision” and arguably would consider the dollar cost of a taxpayer’s loss, which in Carlton was 
significant.  512 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 73. Id. at 30-31, 35.  See The Supreme Court, 1993 Term: Leading Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
10
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Court stated that the “harsh and oppressive” formulation “does not differ 
from the prohibition against arbitrary and irrational legislation" that 
applies generally to enactments in the sphere of economic policy.74 The 
due process standard to be applied to tax statutes with “retroactive 
effect,” therefore,  
 
is the same as that generally applicable to retroactive economic 
legislation: “Provided that the retroactive application of a statute is 
supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational 
means, judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain 
within the exclusive province of the legislative and executive 
branches . . . .”75   
 
As applied to retroactive legislation, Carlton recognized that the due 
process test involves an additional step not required in the context of 
prospective legislation.  This is because retroactive legislation has to 
satisfy the standard as to both its retroactive and prospective aspects 
and, as the Court noted, “the justifications for the latter may not suffice 
for the former.”76 Nonetheless, the Court made clear that the test is one 
that is limited to the question of whether there is a “rational legislative 
purpose” in either instance.77  Carlton therefore clarified that the 
standard that a government must meet when defending retroactive tax 
legislation is a low bar, as Justice Scalia’s concurrence and several 
commentators have noted.78   
 
139, 225 (1994) (“…by abandoning the ‘harsh and oppressive’ test, Carlton altered the focus of the 
Court's scrutiny from the effect of the retroactive tax provision on the taxpayer to the reasonableness of 
the legislature's action. This shift in emphasis allowed the Court to avoid any analysis of the complex 
social and economic policy issues that bear on the merits of tax retroactivity”).  
 74. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 30 (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 
717, 733 (1984)). To support its conclusion that the "harsh and oppressive" standard is identical to the 
rational basis test applied more generally to retroactive economic legislation, the Court invoked the 
authority of two cases, Pension Benefit Guaranty, 467 U.S. 717 and Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining 
Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976), neither of which pertained to a tax statute.  See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 30-31.  
Pension Benefit Guaranty upheld retroactive employer liability for withdrawal from federal pension 
plan insurance, 467 U.S. at 729-30, 733, whereas Turner Elkhorn upheld retroactive imposition of black 
lung disease costs on employers as a means to spread the cost of the disabilities, 428 U.S. at 16-17.  
 75. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 30-31 (quoting Pension Benefit Guaranty, 467 U. S. at 729-30, in turn 
quoting Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 16). See Leading Cases, supra note 73, at 226 (noting that Carlton 
transformed the “‘harsh and oppressive’ standard into a generic ‘arbitrary and irrational’ test” — a “shift 
in emphasis from the taxpayer to the legislature”), 228 (stating that the Court's "arbitrary and irrational" 
test shifts the Court's gaze from the taxpayer to the legislature and thus de-emphasizes, if not precludes 
consideration of the magnitude of the tax”). 
 76. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 31 (quoting Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 16-17). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. at 40 (Scalia, J, concurring) (“The reasoning the Court applies to uphold the statute in 
this case guarantees that all retroactive tax laws will henceforth be valid. To pass constitutional muster 
the retroactive aspects of the statute need only be ‘rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose.’  
11
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Moreover, Carlton made clear that the application of the due process 
test with respect to retroactive tax statutes is highly fact-dependent.  For 
example, Carlton repeatedly referenced the Court’s prior decision in 
Welch v. Henry.79  Welch established that the analysis in a case 
evaluating a retroactive tax statute necessarily depends upon the specific 
facts and circumstances: “In each case it is necessary to consider the 
nature of the tax and the circumstances in which it is laid . . . .”80  
Consistent with Welch, the Supreme Court in Carlton duly analyzed the 
specific facts, as discussed below. 
1. Legitimate Legislative Purpose 
As enacted in October 1986, § 2057 contained no requirement that the 
decedent, whose estate later sold company stock to an ESOP, must have 
owned the stock before dying to qualify for the ESOP proceeds 
deduction.81 As a result, any estate could claim the deduction simply by 
buying company stock in the market and immediately reselling it to the 
company’s ESOP, thereby obtaining a potentially dramatic reduction in, 
or even elimination of, the estate tax obligation.82  Based on these facts, 
and its review of the 1986 and 1987 legislative history, the Supreme 
Court in Carlton noted that there “is little doubt that the 1987 
amendment to § 2057 was adopted as a curative measure,”83 and 
concluded that this was a legitimate purpose.   The Court specifically 
noted that Congress acted appropriately “to correct what it reasonably 
viewed as a mistake in the original 1986 provision that would have 
created a significant and unanticipated revenue loss.”84 
 
Revenue raising is certainly a legitimate legislative purpose…. and any law that retroactively adds a tax, 
removes a deduction, or increases a rate rationally furthers that goal.”) (citations omitted); Stewart 
Hastings, Gambling with the IRS: The Enforcement of Retroactive Tax Statutes in United States v. 
Carlton, 47 MERCER L. REV. 1163, 1179 (1996) (“A tax statute would presumably always satisfy the 
Court's ‘low scrutiny’ due process test, since all tax statutes are for the ‘legitimate purpose’ of 
generating revenue and retroactive taxation is rationally related to that purpose”); Burton, supra note 62, 
at 512 (citing GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 462 n. 1 (12th ed. 1991) (noting that the 
rational basis standard adopted by the court is one that traditionally results in “minimal scrutiny in 
theory and virtually none in fact”).  See also Dot Foods, Inc. v. State, Dep’t. of Revenue, 372 P.3d 747, 
750 (Wash. 2016) (“The rational basis test is the most relaxed form of judicial scrutiny.”) (citation 
omitted); Gillette Commer. Operations N. Am v. Dep't of Treasury, 878 N.W.2d 891, 907 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2015) (referring to Carlton’s “relatively easy two-part test”), rev. denied, 880 N.W.2d 230 (Mich. 
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017).  
 79. See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 30, 33-34 (citing Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938)).   
 80. Welch, 305 U.S. at 148.  The Court’s full quote was that: “In each case it is necessary to 
consider the nature of the tax and the circumstances in which it is laid before it can be said that its 
retroactive application is so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation.” Id.    
 81. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 31. 
 82. Id.   
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 33. 
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Much of the recent criticism pertaining to retroactive state tax statutes 
has focused on a comparison between the legislative action in the recent 
state cases and what the critics have contended was the correction of an 
obvious mistake in Carlton.85  The critics have argued that, while 
Congress legitimately addressed a clear mistake in Carlton, no similar 
mistake has been the statutory predicate in the state cases; hence, the 
argument goes, the legislation in the state cases is more questionable.86  
But Carlton did not hold that the only legitimate purpose for a 
retroactive tax statute is the correction of a legislative mistake.  After 
analyzing Congress’ asserted rationale for the legislation, the Court 
suggested that the key determinant is that the purpose of the law is 
neither “illegitimate nor arbitrary.”87  The Court also stated, “there is no 
plausible contention that Congress acted with an improper motive, as by 
targeting estate representatives such as Carlton after deliberately 
inducing them to engage in ESOP transactions.”88  Ultimately, the Court 
concluded, “We cannot say that [Congress’] decision was 
unreasonable.”89 
Carlton also suggests that permissible “curative measures” are not 
limited to the circumstance where the legislature fixes a mistake, 
because even in Carlton the statute that was amended was not obviously 
a “mistake.”90 Mr. Carlton read the clear language of § 2057 and 
concluded that the statute provided an incentive for an estate to sell 
stock in a company to the company’s ESOP, whether or not the 
decedent owned the stock at the time of death.  The Ninth Circuit 
concluded that, when read in this manner, the statute was not so 
 
 85. See, e.g., Brief of the Am. Coll. of Tax Counsel as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 9, at 3, 10-12 (stating that the recent cases diverge from Carlton which pertained to “the 
legislative correction of an acknowledged drafting error”); Brief for the Tax Exec. Inst., Inc. as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 9, at 8-9 (referring to Carlton as pertaining to “clear error,” a 
“scrivener’s error”).  But see infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text (noting that the Supreme Court 
did not clearly consider the prior legislative language at issue in Carlton to be a mistake and that the 
Ninth Circuit specifically rejected this interpretation).  
 86. See, e.g., Brief for the Tax Exec. Inst., Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 9, at 14 (arguing that Carlton involved “an easy case” fixing “an obvious drafting error,” unlike in 
Dot Foods where the court would have to consider what is an “‘illegitimate’ or ‘arbitrary’ legislative 
purpose”). 
 87. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 32. 
 88. Id. The Court acknowledged that Congress could have chosen to address “the unanticipated 
revenue loss through general prospective taxation,” but observed that choice would have burdened 
equally ‘innocent’ taxpayers.” Id. The Court also suggested that it was logical for Congress to decide “to 
prevent the loss by denying the deduction to those who had made purely tax-motivated stock transfers.” 
Id.  
 89. Id.  
 90. The majority’s only reference to the term “mistake” was its statement that “Congress acted to 
correct what it reasonably viewed as a mistake.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Therefore, even the majority 
allowed for the interpretation that, irrespective of the post hoc Congressional characterization, the 
predecessor language was not a mistake in fact. 
13
Fatale: Connecting the Dot: Retroactive State Tax Statutes Revisit United
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
46 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86 
different from other “huge tax incentives . . . Congress [had] created to 
encourage the development of ESOPS.”91  The Ninth Circuit also 
concluded that there was very little evidence in the bill-writing process 
to suggest that the language was unintentional, as the bill was enacted 
without changes as first proposed two and a half years before it was 
finally adopted.92  Finally, the Ninth Circuit noted that the only relevant 
legislative history — “two passing references in congressional 
documents” — merely stated that ESOP deductions “would be available 
to a decedent who sold his company to an employee group,” not that 
they would be limited to that situation.93 
In separate concurrences, Justices O’Connor and Scalia (the latter 
joined by Justice Thomas) both dismissed the Carlton majority’s 
suggestion that what Congress fixed was a legislative mistake.  Justice 
Scalia noted that the Court relied mostly on “some post-legislation 
legislative history” that was at odds with “the uncontested plain meaning 
of the statute.”94  Justice O’Connor noted that despite what some 
“prominent members of the tax writing committees” may have observed 
in printed materials, the “subjective motivation” of Congress as a whole 
in passing a law is difficult to discern and logically irrelevant.95   Justice 
O’Connor stated that determining that a legislative fix was meant to 
correct a mistake is illogical because “[e]very law touching on an area in 
which Congress has previously legislated can be said to serve the 
legislative purpose of fixing a perceived problem with the prior state of 
affairs — there is no reason to pass a new law, after all, if the legislators 
are satisfied with the old one.”96   
 
 91. Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1060 (1992).  The court noted that “[t]he federal 
Government [had] long sought to promote employee ownership of shares in their employees” and that § 
2057 as originally enacted furthered “the public policy of employee ownership.” Id. See Burton, supra 
note 62, at 520 (noting the example of a seemingly similar mistake in the Internal Revenue Code that 
was not later fixed). See also Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1060 (“when the private actor had completed the 
socially desirable action of selling shares at a discount to an ESOP, the government reneged on its end 
of the deal”); Andrew C. Weiler, Has Due Process Struck Out? The Judicial Rubberstamping of 
Retroactive Economic Laws, 42 DUKE L.J. 1069, 1103 11103 (1993) (“[I]t is difficult to disagree with 
the Carlton majority’s characterization that Congress created an incentive and then dismantled it after 
the fact because it was dissatisfied (and surprised) with the result.”). 
 92. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1060 (stating, inter alia, “Carlton had little reason to think Congress had 
made a drafting error”). Compare comments referenced supra note 85. 
 93. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1059.  Burton, supra note 62, at 516 (noting that Carlton determined 
that Congress made a mistake in 1986 by relying “on the legislative history of the 1987 amendment, not 
on the legislative history of the 1986 amendment,” and “[b]ecause the Court did not consider evidence 
of what the anticipated revenue loss was in 1986, it was forced to take Congress’ word in 1987 that it 
anticipated a significantly smaller revenue loss in 1986”) (emphasis in original).  
 94. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring).   
 95. Id. at 36-37 (O’Connor, J. concurring).  The Ninth Circuit noted that the legislative history 
consisted largely of a “pamphlet written by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation” and that this 
pamphlet did “not purport to speak for Congress.” 972 F.2d at 1059. 
 96. Id. at 36 (stating, inter alia, “this mode of analysis proves too much”), 37 (“It is sufficient for 
14
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Carlton concluded that the statute met the legitimate purpose standard 
since Congress acted to prevent “a significant and unanticipated revenue 
loss.”97  Justices O’Connor and Scalia both emphasized that a 
retroactive tax statute could always be justified by the need to raise tax 
revenue.  Justice O’Connor further stated that “[r]etroactive application 
of revenue measures is rationally related to the legitimate governmental 
purpose of raising revenue.”98 She explained that: 
 
In enacting revenue measures, retroactivity allows “the legislative 
body, in the revision of tax laws, to distribute increased costs of 
government among its taxpayers in the light of present need for 
revenue and with knowledge of the sources and amounts of the 
various classes of taxable income during the taxable period 
preceding revision.”99 
 
Justice Scalia also stated, “Revenue raising is certainly a legitimate 
legislative purpose . . . and any law that retroactively adds a tax, 
removes a deduction, or increases a rate rationally furthers that goal.”100 
2. Rational Means 
Carlton also concluded that the retroactive legislation met the second 
requirement, that the government’s legitimate legislative purpose was 
furthered by a rational means.101  The Court found that “Congress acted 
promptly and established only a modest period of retroactivity.”102 The 
Court analogized the statute to “general revenue statutes” that are 
enacted by Congress, which it noted “almost without exception” are 
given “effective dates prior to the dates of actual enactment.”103  It also 
cited Welch v. Henry,104 where the Court upheld a statute that had 
“retroactive effect” of two-plus years.105  Lastly, the Court noted that, 
 
due process analysis if there exists some legitimate purpose underlying the retroactivity provision.”). 
 97. Id. at 32 (majority opinion). 
 98. Id. at 37 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 99. Id. at 37 (quoting Welch v. Henry, 305 U. S. 134, 149 (1938)). 
 100. Id. at 40 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 101. Id. at 30-33 (majority opinion). 
 102. Id. at 32. 
 103. Id. at 32-33 (quoting United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 296-97 (1981)). The Court 
noted that this “customary congressional practice” generally has been "confined to short and limited 
periods required by the practicalities of producing national legislation." Id. at 33 (quoting Darusmont, 
449 U.S. at 296-297). 
 104. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938). 
 105. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 33 (noting that in Welch, 305 U.S. 134, the Court “upheld a Wisconsin 
income tax adopted in 1935 on dividends received in 1933”).  See also Welch, 305 U.S. at 141 (noting 
that the legislature enacted a tax in March of 1935 that increased the rate of tax on dividends paid in 
15
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while “the actual retroactive effect” of the statute was a period slightly 
in excess of one year, it was relevant that “the amendment was proposed 
by the IRS in January 1987 and by Congress in February 1987, within a 
few months of § 2057’s original enactment.”106 
Much of the criticism pertaining to the recent retroactive state tax 
statutes has focused on the length of the statutes’ retroactivity as 
compared to that in Carlton. Critics have argued that retroactive tax 
statutes that are significantly longer than the one-plus year in Carlton 
should be struck down.107  However, Carlton did not hold that the length 
of retroactivity was a specific test to be applied to a retroactive tax 
statute; it merely suggested that this length was one factor to consider 
when determining whether a legitimate purpose is effected by a rational 
means.  Also, Carlton did not conclude that when the length of a statute 
is a consideration, one year is the logical limit. The Court merely 
observed that Congressional practice generally assumes that tax statutes 
can be made retroactive to the prior year and that the Court’s prior cases 
have typically approved that result. 
Significantly, the imposition of a bright-line temporal limit on the 
retroactive period of a tax statute would be inconsistent with the Court’s 
intended focus on whether the legislative action was rational.108  This is 
necessarily a facts and circumstances test that evaluates the “actual 
retroactive effect” of the tax statute, which the Court indicated could be 
at variance with the formal length of the statute’s retroactivity.109  In 
Carlton, the Court suggested that the actual retroactive effect of the 
amendment to § 2057 mirrored the statute’s formal length of 
retroactivity, but that other considerations — like the fact that the 
forthcoming legislation was signaled beforehand, first, by the IRS and 
then by Congress — were also relevant.110 
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor expressed concern with the 
 
1933).  But see Carlton, 512 U.S. at 38 (O’Connor, concurring) (noting that although the retroactive 
period in Welch was two years, the legislature that enacted the law met only every two years). 
 106. Id. at 33 (majority opinion). See also id. at 34 (noting that the statute’s “period of retroactive 
effect is limited”). 
 107. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Council on State Taxation in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 5, at 15 (“The Court’s precedents in Carlton and similar decisions make it clear that the Due 
Process Clause prevents retroactive tax legislation from reaching back indefinitely.”).  
 108. See Leading Cases, supra note 73, at 230 (“The Court’s use of two stages of rational basis 
review (for the prospective and retroactive aspects of a tax provision) accords with its focus on the 
actions of the legislature rather than on the impact on the taxpayer. However, the imposition of a bright-
line temporal limit on the presumptively permissible period of retroactivity is inconsistent with that 
focus.”). 
 109. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 33-34. The Court repeatedly cited to Welch, which stated, inter alia, that 
the analysis depends upon “the nature of the tax and the circumstances in which it is laid.” See id. at 30, 
33-34 (citing Welch, 512 U.S. at 138). 
 110. Id. at 33 (noting that the amendment had been proposed by the IRS in an administrative 
release in January of 1987 and by Congress itself in February 1987, prior to the law’s enactment). 
16
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potential implications of the Court’s holding.  She stated that the 
“governmental interest in revising tax laws” should be balanced against 
a taxpayer’s “interest in finality and repose” and that due regard should 
be accorded to a taxpayer’s “settled expectations.”111  Justice O’Connor 
noted that the Court’s relevant prior decisions all focused on retroactive 
tax statutes that had relatively short retroactive periods; she further 
stated, “A period of retroactivity longer than the year preceding the 
legislative session in which the law was enacted would raise, in my 
view, serious constitutional questions.”112 But no other member of the 
Court expressed sympathy with Justice O’Connor’s point, and Justice 
Scalia’s two-person concurrence flatly rejected it.113  Also, Justice 
O’Connor did not state that a statute reflecting a longer period of 
retroactivity should necessarily be struck down, only that such statutes 
require greater scrutiny.114   
3. Reasonable Reliance and Constructive Notice 
The Ninth Circuit in Carlton struck down Congress’ retroactive tax 
statute because the law was “harsh and oppressive,” both because the 
taxpayer had reasonably relied upon the statute and also because he had 
no actual or constructive knowledge that a corrective retroactive law 
would be adopted.115  The Ninth Circuit concluded that not only did the 
taxpayer rely upon the statute’s clear language, but that he also had 
cause to believe that Congress meant to provide an incentive for the very 
 
 111. Id. at 37-38 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice O’Connor’s mention of “settled 
expectations” apparently referred to the judicial doctrine that applies to retroactive statutes that are 
curative, ratifying legislation.  See infra notes 256-278 and 281-301 and accompanying text. 
 112. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 38 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (“In every case in 
which we have upheld a retroactive federal tax statute against due process challenge, however, the law 
applied retroactively for only a relatively short period prior to enactment.”).  
 113. See, e.g., id. at 40 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The reasoning the Court applies to uphold the 
statute in this case guarantees that all retroactive tax laws will henceforth be valid … I welcome this 
recognition that the Due Process Clause does not prevent retroactive taxes.”) 
 114. In a case decided by the Supreme Court two years before Carlton, Justice O’Connor 
authored the decision upholding a retroactive economic statute where the retroactive period was six 
years. General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 US 181 (1992).  Carlton analogized the analysis to be 
applied to retroactive tax statute to that applicable to retroactive economic statutes, 512 U.S. at 31-32, 
and Romein applied the two-step test later applied in Carlton, 503 U.S. at 191. For a discussion of 
Romein, see infra notes 281-301 and accompanying text.  See also infra notes 403-423 and 
accompanying text (discussing Caprio v. New York State Dep’t of Taxation & Finance, 37 N.E.3d 707, 
rehearing denied, 38 N.E.3d 817 (2015), in which New York’s highest court approved a statute that a 
had a retroactive length of 3½ years, despite the fact that one of the court’s tests applied to determine the 
validity of a retroactive tax statute was a focus on the length of the retroactivity); River Garden 
Retirement Home v. Franchise Tax Bd., 186 Cal. App. 4th 922, 948-49 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (similar). 
 115. Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 1992).  The court concluded 
that he had no actual knowledge of the later change, “[n]or is there any basis upon which Carlton could 
have had constructive notice [of such change].”  Id. at 1059 (square brackets added). 
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action that he took since the “federal government had long sought to 
promote employee ownership of shares in their employers.”116   
In response, the Supreme Court clarified that the legal focus must be 
on the legitimacy of the action taken by the government, not on its 
impact on the aggrieved taxpayer.117  The Court conceded that the 
taxpayer had relied upon the statute, but concluded that “his reliance 
alone is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.”118  It stated 
that “[t]ax legislation is not a promise, and a taxpayer has no vested 
right in the Internal Revenue Code.”119  The Court also quoted Welch v. 
Henry, stating “Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer 
nor a liability which he assumes by contract. It is but a way of 
apportioning the cost of government among those who in some measure 
are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its burdens.”120  The 
Court noted that “[s]ince no citizen enjoys immunity from that [tax] 
burden, its retroactive imposition does not necessarily infringe due 
process . . . .”121  
Carlton also cited prior Supreme Court cases for the conclusion that 
the taxpayer’s lack of notice regarding the retroactive tax amendment 
was irrelevant.122  The Court stated that a taxpayer “should be regarded 
as taking his chances of any increase in the tax burden which might 
 
 116. Id. at 1060. 
 117. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 30-35.   
 118. Id. at 33. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. (quoting Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1938)). 
 121. Id. (quoting Welch, 305 U.S. at 146-47) (brackets added). Welch’s more detailed statement 
on the point was that:  
The equitable distribution of the costs of government through the medium of an income tax 
is a delicate and difficult task. In its performance experience has shown the importance of 
reasonable opportunity for the legislative body, in the revision of tax laws, to distribute 
increased costs of government among its taxpayers in the light of present need for revenue 
and with knowledge of the sources and amounts of the various classes of taxable income 
during the taxable period preceding revision. Without that opportunity accommodation of the 
legislative purpose to the need may be seriously obstructed if not defeated. We cannot say 
that the due process which the Constitution exacts denies that opportunity to legislatures; that 
it withholds from them, more than in the case of a prospective tax, authority to distribute the 
increased tax burden in the light of experience and in conformity with accepted notions of 
the requirements of equal protection; or that in view of well established legislative practice, 
both state and national, taxpayers can justly assert surprise or complain of arbitrary action in 
the retroactive apportionment of tax burdens to income at the first opportunity after 
knowledge of the nature and amount of the income is available. 
Welch, 305 U.S. at 149-50. 
 122. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 34 (citing Welch, 305 U.S. 134; Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15 
(1931)).  One commentator has argued that the Court’s prior precedent had been less than clear on the 
point, but that Carlton “put an end to the notice debate.”  See Ronald Z. Domsky, Retroactive Taxation: 
United States v. Carlton—The Taxpayer Loses Again!, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 77, 87-88 (1995).  That 
commentator observed that in Carlton, “the taxpayer did not have any type of notice, not even the loose 
constructive notice of pending legislation.”  Id.   
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result from carrying out the established policy of taxation.”123  
Effectively, the Court concluded that a taxpayer is always on notice that 
the tax law may be changed.124 
The one circumstance where the Court acknowledged that taxpayer 
reliance interests should be respected, and therefore that a retroactive tax 
statute could be struck down, is where the statute can be properly 
characterized as creating “a wholly new tax.”125  But even here, the 
Court’s allowance was limited since the Court’s concept of a wholly 
new tax was not one that results from the amendment of a pre-existing 
statute.126  Thus, for example, one state supreme court, reviewing 
Carlton, concluded that the tax in Carlton was in fact a “new tax” — 
one that was “assessed and collected after enactment of the new statute” 
in a context in which the “tax is imposed after the event being taxed has 
occurred.”127  But in Carlton’s view the retroactive tax at issue — an 
amendment to a pre-existing statute — was, if new, not “wholly” new.   
Commentators have criticized Carlton for not respecting the 
taxpayer’s reliance interests and for positing a test that refuses to 
consider such interests more generally.128 Carlton concluded, however, 
that a judicial focus on taxpayer reliance would subject retroactive tax 
 
 123. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 34 (quoting Milliken, 283 U. S. at 23). 
 124. See Domsky, supra note 122, at 88. 
 125. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 34. The Court noted that its three gift and estate tax cases from 1927 and 
1928 finding for the taxpayer, which were relied upon by the Ninth Circuit, could be distinguished on 
this basis. Id. 
 126. See Domsky, supra note 122, at 90 (noting that “One exception that remains from the [sic] 
successful challenges on retroactivity is the prohibition on retroactive ‘wholly new taxes,’” and citing as 
a possible example that “Congress could not pass the VAT (value added tax) or a national sales tax on 
February 1 and then make it retroactive to the first of the year”); Gunning, supra note 64, at 300 (wholly 
new taxes are distinct from “amendments to existing tax schemes that retroactively impact prior 
transactions”).  
 127. Zaber v. City of Dubuque, 789 N.W.2d 634, 645 (Iowa 2010). 
 128. Faith Colson, Constitutional Law Due Process—The Supreme Court Sounds the Death Knell 
for Due Process Challenges to Retroactive Tax Legislation: United States v. Carlton, 27 RUTGERS L. J. 
243, 265 (1995) (arguing for the use of a balancing test in place of the test adopted by Carlton and 
stating, “In determining the weight to be given to the taxpayer's interest, reliance is key”); Domsky, 
supra note 122, at 81 (stating that ideally “a balance must be struck between legislative change and 
reasonable reliance by the taxpayer”); Castellano, supra note 65, at 447  (agreeing with the Ninth Circuit 
in Carlton that “in the gift and estate tax arena, [retroactivity should require] that the taxpayer have fair 
notice of the nature and amount of the tax to be imposed before the transaction could be affected.”); 
Robert C. DeGaudenzi, Death is Still Certain, But Are Taxes?: An Examination of the Due Process 
Limitations on Retroactive Tax Legislation After Carlton v. United States, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 327, 
344 (1993) (“policy would dictate against retroactivity to the extent a taxpayer has reasonably relied on 
an existing law”); Andrew G. Schultz, Graveyard Robbery in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993: A Modern Look at the Constitutionality of Retroactive Taxes, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 775, 796-
799 (1994) (the review of retroactive tax legislation should focus in part on whether there is reasonable 
detrimental reliance on the part of the taxpayer). Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An 
Equilibrium, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1056 (1997) (noting that in some instances where “reliance 
interests are at their peak … [r]etroactivity … presents serious fairness and efficiency concerns and 
should be disfavored.”). 
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laws to an “unduly strict standard.”129  By allowing the analysis to focus 
on the plight of a taxpayer, such an approach would enable the judiciary 
to frustrate the fiscal determinations made by the legislative and 
executive branches and otherwise engage in policy-making that is the 
general province of those governmental branches.130   
Carlton concluded that so long as the legislative action is reasonable, 
the resulting statute cannot be claimed to be unfair within the meaning 
of the Due Process Clause.  Lawmakers are elected officials and one can 
presume, as Carlton implicitly did, that the political process will 
generally forestall retroactive tax measures that are unfair.131  Some 
commentators have expressed concern that certain classes of taxpayers 
might not have the lobbying clout to prevent retroactive taxes from 
being applied to them.132  In general, concern for taxpayers that lack 
political clout is an important consideration when the judiciary evaluates 
the constitutionality of any legislative enactment.133  But when 
 
 129. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 35. 
 130. Carlton quoted Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963), for the proposition that its 
prior approach engaging in “exacting review of economic legislation … has long since been discarded.” 
512 U.S. at 34.  See Leading Cases, supra note 73, at 227 (Carlton’s “emphasis on the reasonableness of 
the legislature's actions indicates that the Court will not ‘substitute [its] social and economic beliefs for 
the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.’”) (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 
U.S. at 730). See also Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 437-538 (1998) (“The day is gone 
when this Court uses the Due Process Clause . . . to strike down . . . laws, regulatory of business and 
industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular 
school of thought”) (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955)).  
 131. See Fisch, supra note 128, at 1111 (“Several scholars have argued that the political process 
constrains the use of retroactive legislation.”); James M. Puckett, Embracing the Queen of Hearts: 
Deference to Retroactive Tax Rules, 40 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 349, 379 (2013) (noting that protections for 
taxpayers that would be affected by retroactive tax statutes are provided by the political process).  
 132. See generally the articles referenced supra note 128. 
 133. The “harsh and oppressive” formulation of Welch v. Henry and the judicial logic of that case 
— an important predecessor to Carlton — was rooted in the reasoning in U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 
U.S. 144 (1938). See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 148, 152-53 (evaluating a due process challenge to 
economic legislation and concluding that the legislation was entitled to a “presumption of 
constitutionality” and would be upheld so long as it had a “rational basis”).  Burton, supra note 62, at 
514 (noting that Welch and Carolene Products were decided in the same year within 7 months of each 
other, were both written by Justice Harlan Stone, and each state similar standards of review).  The well -
known footnote 4 of Carolene Products explained that economic legislation is evaluated under a more 
deferential standard of review — as compared with legislation that targets “discrete and insular 
minorities” — because the political process can be trusted to guard against inequitable such legislation.  
See 304 U.S. at 153, n. 4 (“political processes … can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of 
undesirable legislation”).  See also M. Bryan Schneider, The Supreme Court’s Reluctance to Enforce 
Constitutional Prohibitions Against Retroactive Income Tax Statutes, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1603, 1617 
n.75 (1994) (“The deferential standard afforded Congress in passing retroactive tax laws … stems from 
the Court's reliance on the famous, or, depending on your view, infamous, footnote 4 of Carolene 
Products, which the Court has used extensively for justification in reviewing economic legislation under 
a more deferential standard than other types of legislation.”) (full citation omitted).  In Carlton, the 
Court likened retroactive tax legislation to retroactive economic legislation more generally — 
suggesting that taxpayers’ typical means to oppose such laws is the political process.  See 512 U.S. at 
30.  See also General Motors Corp. v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 803 N.W.2d 698, 710 (Mich. Ct. App. 
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retroactive tax statutes are used to address budgetary concerns, as was 
true in Carlton and has been the typical circumstance in the recent state 
tax cases, almost invariably the affected taxpayers will have significant 
economic resources and lobbying clout.  This point is demonstrated by 
Dot Foods and the recent Michigan consolidated cases pertaining to the 
Multistate Tax Compact  — the cases that resulted in Supreme Court 
certiorari petitions that were denied in 2017 — as those cases pertained 
to large companies with significant lobbying clout.134   
Before turning to Dot Foods and state tax retroactivity more 
generally, it is noteworthy that it was the taxpayer’s reasonable reliance 
on the pre-existing unambiguous statute in Carlton that instigated the 
Supreme Court case since that reliance prompted the Ninth Circuit to 
break from decades of Supreme Court precedent to rule for the taxpayer.  
Also, as has been noted, it was the Supreme Court’s refusal to respect 
this taxpayer reliance that engendered the most criticism.135  In contrast, 
Dot Foods and the other recent state tax cases generally pertained to pre-
existing legislation that was not clearly-worded and only later clarified 
by a court decision in a manner that was inconsistent with the state’s 
prior interpretation.  Therefore, Dot Foods and the other recent state tax 
cases do not reflect the same reliance concerns that were suggested by 
Carlton. 
II. DOT FOODS, INC. V. DEP’T OF REVENUE 
A. Background 
The legislation in Dot Foods pertained to Washington’s Business & 
Occupation (B&O) tax, a tax that is imposed “for the act or privilege of 
engaging in business activities” in the state.136  The legislation was 
enacted in 1983, and provided an exemption from the tax when an entity 
made “sales in this state exclusively to or through a direct seller’s 
representative.”137  A “direct seller’s representative” was defined as a 
 
2010) (the Carlton rational basis test is a “negative statement of the substantive due process requirement 
that legislation that does not affect a suspect classification or involve the deprivation of a fundamental 
right must merely bear a reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective”). 
 134. Dot Foods and the Michigan consolidated cases are discussed supra notes 1-2 and 
accompanying test.  For a listing of some of the amici that supported the Supreme Court certiorari 
petitions filed for the taxpayers in these cases, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.  See also David 
Brunori, Who Are The Most Influential People in State Tax? STATE TAX TODAY: TAX ANALYSTS (May 
6, 2008) (noting the particular lobbying clout of the Council on State Taxation, one of the amici in both 
cases). 
 135. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 136. Dot Foods, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 173 P.3d 309, 311-12 (Wash Ct. App 2007), rev’d, 215 
P.3d 185, 187 (2009). 
 137. Dot Foods, Inc. v. Wash. Dep’t of Revenue, 215 P.3d 185, 187 (Wash. 2009) (citing Former 
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person who buys consumer products on a buy-sell basis or for 
commission for resale and that makes sales “in the home or otherwise 
than in a permanent retail establishment.”138 A “permanent retail 
establishment” (“PRE”) referred to retail locations such as grocery 
stores.139  
The language in the Washington exemption was derived from a 1982 
Internal Revenue Code provision that similarly pertained to “direct 
sellers.”140 In that context, the IRS described “direct sellers” as 
individuals who sold products “person to person,” i.e., as a consumer 
“alternative to shopping centers, department stores, or the like.”141 
Although there was a dispute in the Dot Foods case about the 
application of the state’s “direct seller” exemption to the taxpayer, there 
was “no dispute that [the] exemption was designed to provide a tax 
exemption for those engaged in direct sales of consumer products, in 
each case ‘in the home or otherwise than in a permanent retail 
establishment.’”142 The record in the Dot Foods case “identified some 
well-known direct selling companies, including Mary Kay, Avon, 
Pampered Chef, Longaberger and Creative Memories.”143   
B. Dot Foods’ In-state Activity and Washington’s Approach to the 
Exemption 
During the tax period in question, Dot Foods was the largest food 
distributor in the United States.144  It was an Illinois corporation that 
produced food products outside Washington and sold those food 
products in Washington to dairies, meat packers, food processers and 
other food service companies.145 During the relevant tax period Dot 
 
RCW 82.04.423(1)(d)).  
 138. Id. (citing RCW 82.04.423(2)).  Specifically, that statutory section applied to: “[A] person 
who buys consumer products on a buy-sell basis or a deposit-commission basis for resale, by the buyer 
or any other person, in the home or otherwise than in a permanent retail establishment, or who sells, or 
solicits the sale of, consumer products in the home or otherwise than in a permanent retail 
establishment.”  Id. 
 139. Id.  
 140. See Brief of Respondent, at 14-15, Dot Foods v. Dep’t of Revenue, 173 P.3d 309 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2007) (No. 357330-II). 
 141. See Supplemental Brief for Respondent at 14, Dot Foods, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 215 P.3d 
185 (Wash. 2009) (No. 81022-2). 
 142. 215 P.3d at 192 (Stephens, J., dissenting).  See Brief in Opposition to Petition of Writ of 
Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court at 17-18 n.2, Dot Foods, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 137 S. Ct. 2156  
(No. 16-308), 2016 WL 7156378 at *17 n.2  (noting that “The underlying purpose for the direct seller’s 
exemption was well known to the 2010 Legislature, and Dot Foods does not argue otherwise in its 
petition for certiorari.”).  
 143. 215 P.3d at 192 (Stephens, J., dissenting).   
 144. See Brief of Respondent, supra note 140, at 1, 4. 
 145. 215 P.3d at 187. See 173 P.3d at 310-311.   
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Foods effected those sales through its wholly owned subsidiary, DTI.146   
The companies to which DTI sold products in turn (1) used these 
products as ingredients to make other products, which were then sold to 
PREs (e.g., grocery stores) or (2) resold the products to other food 
service operators or institutions (e.g., nursing homes, schools, hospitals 
and cafeterias).147   
Because Dot Foods sold products into Washington that were 
eventually sold in PREs, it was apparently not the type of seller that was 
intended to be included under the statutory exemption.  However, the 
literal language of the statute was not explicit on this point.148  
Moreover, Dot Foods took the position that it was entitled to the 
exemption sometime after its enactment and that position was not 
initially contested by the Washington Department of Revenue (the 
“DOR” or “Department”).149  At some point, however, the company 
recognized that its position was at least questionable, and in 1997, it 
requested a letter ruling from the Department confirming its entitlement 
to the exemption.150   
The DOR issued Dot Foods a private letter ruling in October 1997, 
stating that the company qualified for the direct seller exemption.151  
The DOR does not publish letter rulings152 and there is no suggestion in 
 
 146. 215 P.3d at 187. See 173 P.3d at 311.   
 147. 215 P.3d at 187. See 173 P.3d at 311 (“some of the consumer products ultimately ended up in 
permanent retail establishments”).  Dot Foods also sold a small amount (< 1%) of non-consumer 
products — cash register receipt rolls, pretzel display cabinets, straw dispensers and chefs’ hats, etc. 215 
P.3d at 187.   
 148. See 173 P.3d at 314. 
 149. The several decided cases and various briefs filed are unclear on the specific facts.  The 2009 
Washington Supreme Court decision states that up through 1999 “For many years, Dot received a B&O 
exemption for 100 percent of its sales pursuant to [the exemption].” 215 P.3d at 187. But the court 
clearly included in the “many years” the 1997-1999 period for which the Washington DOR had issued 
Dot Foods a letter ruling that it subsequently revoked.  See id.  Also, a related case decided in 2001, The 
Stroh Brewery Co. Dep’t of Revenue, 15 P.3d 692, 696 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001), rev. denied, 29 P.3d 718 
(2001), concluded that no prior Washington DOR administrative guidance had specifically addressed 
the issue.  See id. at 696. The Washington DOR in a filing with the state’s supreme court “readily 
admit[ted] that before 2000 it erroneously allowed some taxpayers, including Dot [Foods], to take the 
direct seller’s exemption.” See Supplemental Brief of Respondent, supra note 141, at 2 (brackets added). 
Taxpayers routinely take the position that unaudited tax returns constitute precedential action on the part 
of a tax agency but this is not correct as a matter of law.  See, e.g., Comptroller v. Gore Enterprise 
Holdings, 60 A.3d 107, 117-18 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013).  Consistent with this notion, the court’s 
statement in Dot Foods seems to suggest the court’s view that Dot Foods “received” the exemption prior 
to 1997, in the sense that it claimed the exemption on its tax returns for some of those years and was not 
contested with respect to those filings by the Washington DOR.   
 150. 173 P.3d at 311.  The inquiry was at first anonymous; only later did the inquirer identify 
itself as Dot Foods.  See Brief of Respondent, supra note 140, at 5. 
 151. 173 P.3d at 311.  Dot Foods created its subsidiary DTI to take advantage of the ruling.  See 
Brief in Opposition to Petition of Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, supra note 142, at 17-18 
n.2. 
 152. Jennifer Carr, Washington Guidance Policies May Affect Tax Avoidance Provision, STATE 
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any of the later cases or briefs that any other taxpayers became aware of, 
or acted in reliance on, this ruling.  Certainly, Dot Foods itself would 
have had no incentive to advise its competitors of its favored tax status.  
The 1997 letter ruling specified that it was binding on both Dot Foods 
and the Department but that it would only remain binding until: "the 
facts change; the law (either by statute or court decision) changes; the 
applicable rule(s) change; the Department of Revenue publicly 
announces a change in the policy upon which this ruling is based; or Dot 
Foods, Inc. is notified in writing that this ruling is not valid.”153 
In 1999, the Washington DOR issued a regulation, effective 
December 31 of that year, which effectively rescinded the Dot Foods 
private letter ruling.154  That regulation clarified that “in order to qualify 
for the exemption, out-of-state sellers could never sell any consumer 
products that anyone will eventually sell in a permanent retail 
establishment anywhere in the chain of distribution.”155 One impetus for 
the regulation was that the state had become involved in a judicial 
dispute with Stroh Brewery, in which the state opposed Stroh Brewery’s 
claim that it qualified for the direct seller’s exemption.156 The state’s 
argument in that case — which was later upheld by the state’s appeals 
court — was that Stroh Brewery did not qualify for the exemption 
because its beverages were resold by unrelated in-state distributors to 
retail outlets such as restaurants and taverns, rather than being sold 
through in-home parties or door-to-door marketing.157   
In February 2000, the Department issued a “Special Notice for Direct 
Sellers,” which informed taxpayers that the Department had updated its 
interpretation of the B&O tax.158  The notice directed taxpayers to the 
revised regulation.  It specifically stated that “[i]f a consumer product is 
sold by anyone in a permanent retail establishment, the direct seller’s 
 
TAX TODAY: TAX ANALYSTS (Feb. 4, 2013), 2013 STT 23-7 (noting that Washington does not publish 
redacted versions of the private letter rulings it issues to taxpayers). 
 153. 173 P.3d at 311. 
 154. Id; 215 P.3d at 193-94 and n.3 (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
 155. 215 P.3d at 186-87. 
 156. Stroh Brewery Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 15 P.3d 692 (Wash. Ct of App., 2001), rev. denied, 29 
P.3d 718 (2001). 
 157. See id. at 696.  See also Brief in Opposition to Petition of Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, supra note 142, at 4-5.  Stroh Brewery concluded that “When a direct seller sells 
through a wholesaler, the seller can qualify for the B & O tax exemption in RCW 82.04.423 only if its 
products are never sold in a permanent retail establishment.” 15 P.3d at 696.  The case also concluded 
that “even if the statute’s language is ambiguous, we must resolve the ambiguity in favor of taxation.” 
Id. at 695.  Stroh Brewery was later “relied heavily on” by the trial court in Dot Foods and was also 
relied upon by the court of appeals, 173 P.3d at 312, 315-16.  The Washington Supreme Court later 
distinguished Stroh Brewery and concluded it was “unhelpful” on the theory that, unlike in Stroh 
Brewery, Dot Foods did not make final sales to an in-state wholesaler that then resold the products to 
retailers.  215 P.3d at 191-92. 
 158. 173 P.3d at 311. 
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exemption is not available to the direct seller.”159 The Department sent a 
copy of the notice to Dot Foods, which Dot Foods received.160  
Despite specific notice of the state’s 1999 regulation, Dot Foods 
continued to claim the direct seller exemption.  The Department audited 
Dot Foods with respect to the exemption for the tax years 2000 through 
2004.161 Because some of Dot Food’s products eventually ended up in 
permanent retail establishments, like grocery stores, the Department 
assessed a B&O tax against Dot Foods for the tax periods January 1, 
2000 through December 31, 2003, for 100 percent of its in-state sales.162 
C. Dot Foods’ Litigation with Respect to the Exemption 
Dot Foods paid the tax and filed a refund action in Thurston County 
Superior Court.163 Both sides filed motions for summary judgment. In 
support of its motion, the Department argued Dot Foods did not qualify 
for the exemption because (1) its sales were not exclusively consumer 
products and (2) some of its products eventually ended up in permanent 
retail establishments.164 The Department’s “consumer goods” argument 
was new; it had not previously focused on that argument in either the 
Dot Foods letter ruling or its tax assessment.165   
In 2006, the trial court agreed with the Department on both grounds 
and entered summary judgment in its favor.166 Dot Foods appealed, and 
in 2007 the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision on the 
basis that the exemption required that the vendor engage exclusively in 
 
 159. Id. at 311-12. 
 160. Id. at 312. In a brief filed in the case, the Washington DOR noted that “The notice further 
informed taxpayers that the Department had rescinded four published determinations that had been 
supplanted by the revised rule” — dating back to 1987.  See Brief of Respondent, supra note 140, at 8 
(emphasis added). It is not clear what these published determinations said.  Stroh Brewery references 
four prior “written determinations that applied the direct seller’s exemption.”  15 P.3d at 696.  Although 
published, it seems clear that these determinations were not precedential.  The taxpayer in Stroh 
Brewery argued that they were, but the court cited a state regulation that stated such published 
documents would only be precedential if the Washington DOR so designated them.  Id. at 696 and 696 
n.1 (citing RCW 82.32.410(1)).  Also, in any event, “none of the Department’s determinations directly 
address[ed] whether a direct seller may qualify for the exemption if its products eventually are sold in a 
permanent retail establishment.”  Id. at 696 (brackets added). 
 161. Dot Foods, Inc. v. Washington Dep’t of Revenue, 215 P.3d 185, 187 (Wash. 2009). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 187-88. 
 165. 215 P.3d at 188 n.1. The argument was that, although almost all of Dot Foods’ sale products 
were consumer products such as dry foods, sauces, and refrigerated foods, the remainder of its sales 
were from non-consumer products, such as cash register receipt rolls, pretzel display cabinets, straw 
dispensers, and chef hats, and that the latter such non-consumer sales were disqualifying with respect to 
the exemption.  See id. 
 166. Id. at 188. 
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selling consumer products.167 The court of appeals also held that the 
Department's 1999 regulation was reasonable and supported by 
principles of statutory interpretation and legislative intent, both of which 
suggested that the exemption did not apply to vendors whose products 
ended up in permanent retail establishments.168  
Dot Foods petitioned for further review from the Washington 
Supreme Court, which granted the review and reversed in a 5-4 
opinion.169  The majority held that the language of the statute was 
unambiguous and supported the taxpayer’s claim.170  Because the 
Department’s 1999 regulation was contrary to this meaning, the court 
rejected it.171  The court stated that “[w]hile we give great deference to 
how an agency interprets an ambiguous statute within its area of special 
expertise, such deference is not afforded when the statute in question is 
unambiguous.”172 The court also concluded that deference to the 
Department’s regulation was undermined by the fact that the 
Department’s pre-regulation interpretation was to the contrary.173  It 
stated that “[a]s a general rule, where a statute has been left unchanged 
by the legislature for a significant period of time, the more appropriate 
method to change the interpretation or application of a statute is by 
amendment or revision of the statute, rather than a new agency 
interpretation.”174  
The four-person dissent disagreed with the majority’s statutory 
construction.175  That dissent concluded that the majority’s statement 
that “the more appropriate method to change the interpretation or 
application of a statute is by amendment or revision of the statute, rather 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Dot Foods, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 173 P.3d 309, 315-16 (Wash Ct. App 2007), rev’d, 215 
P.3d 185, 187 (2009).  
 169. Dot Foods, Inc. v. Washington Dep’t of Revenue, 215 P.3d 185, 192 (Wash. 2009). 
 170. Id. at 190-191. 
 171. Id. at 189. 
 172. Id. (quoting Densley v. Dep't of Ret. Sys., 173 P.3d 885, 890 (Wash. 2007)). 
 173. Id. at 189.  Specifically, the Court stated: 
The Department’s argument for deference is a difficult one to accept, considering the 
Department’s history interpreting the exemption. Initially, and shortly after the statutory 
enactment, the Department adopted an interpretation which is at odds with its current 
interpretation. One would think that the Department had some involvement or certainly 
awareness of the legislature’s plans to enact this type of statute.   
Id. The court cited no specific “interpretation” of the statute by the Department, and it is not clear what 
interpretation adopted “shortly after the statutory enactment,” it was referring to.  See supra note 149 
and accompanying text.  
 174. Id. at 189. 
 175. Id. at 192-93 (Stephens, J., dissenting).  Among other things, the dissent noted, “There is no 
dispute that this exemption was designed to provide a tax exemption for those engaged in direct sales of 
consumer products, typically through in-home parties or door-to-door marketing.” Id. at 192. 
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than a new agency interpretation” was “dangerous language.”176 The 
dissent stated that “[c]ertainly, the executive branch has the 
constitutional authority to interpret and implement statutes within its 
purview and it is not required to seek a legislative change whenever it 
determines a prior interpretation was erroneous.”177 The dissent also 
stated that there “is no support for the majority’s refusal to defer to the 
Department's interpretation of [the exemption] because it would have 
preferred that the agency seek a legislative amendment instead of 
exercising its rule-making power.”178  
D. The Retroactive Tax Legislation 
The Washington Supreme Court’s decision in Dot Foods was 
rendered in September, 2009.  Shortly thereafter, the Washington DOR 
estimated that the negative fiscal impact of the decision would be over 
$150 million in the 2009-2011 biennium alone.179  Although Dot Foods 
was the largest food re-distributor in the United States, only a small 
percentage of that amount would be due to Dot Foods.180  Other non-
litigant companies that presumably had been complying with the state’s 
1999 regulation — which had twice been upheld by lower Washington 
courts — would now also be entitled to refunds.181 
Washington, like most states and unlike the federal government, has a 
balanced budget requirement.182  In recognition of the negative fiscal 
impact of the Dot Foods decision, in February 2009, the Washington 
governor unveiled a budget proposal that would both prospectively and 
retroactively amend the exemption for a direct seller.183  That bill was 
 
 176. Id. at 193-94. 
 177. Id. at 194. 
 178. Id. at 194. 
 179. See Dot Foods v. Dep’t Revenue, 372 P.3d 747, 751 n.3 (Wash. 2016).   
 180. See 372 P.3d at 751 n.3 (Wash. 2016) (“Dot Foods’ refund request was for just over 
$500,000 … indicating that other taxpayers would be affected by the 2010 amendment — not just Dot 
Foods.”) (citing Dot Foods’ Respondent Brief at 9). 
 181. See id. The state had to estimate what companies would file claims and to what extent, as 
there was no evidence in the record as to any other taxpayer claims.  See Dot Foods’ Motion for 
Reconsideration, at 17, Dot Foods, Inc. v. Wash. Dep’t of Revenue, 2016 Wash. LEXIS 574 (Wash. 
2016) (No. 92398-1).  
 182. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-
policy/state-balanced-budget-requirements.aspx, updated April 12, 1999 (website of the National 
Conference of State Legislatures notes that 49 states — every state except Vermont — has a balanced 
budget requirement).  See also Julie A. Roin, Retroactive Taxation, Unfunded Pensions, and Shadow 
Bankruptcies, 102 IOWA L. REV. 559, 573 and 573 n.39 (2017). 
 183. See Gregoire: Boost Taxes by $605 Million, WASHINGTON SECRETARY OF STATE BLOG, 
https://blogs.sos.wa.gov/FromOurCorner/index.php/2010/02/gregoire-boost-taxes-by-605-million/  
(“[The Governor] said passing a bill to re-impose a tax on out-of-state companies would halt the loss of 
$154 million due to a new state Supreme Court ruling called Dot Foods.”) (brackets added). 
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passed by the legislature in April 2010, seven months after the Dot 
Foods decision.184  The statute prospectively and retroactively amended 
the exemption to prevent a “large and devastating” loss of state tax 
revenue and to remove an unintended tax incentive for “in-state 
businesses to move their operations outside Washington.”185   
The statute’s legislative history commented on its retroactive 
application. 186  The legislature concluded that its intent “in enacting this 
exemption was to provide a narrow exemption for out-of-state 
businesses engaged in direct sales of consumer products, typically 
accomplished through in-home parties or door-to-door selling.”187 
Therefore, the legislature concluded, “it is necessary to reaffirm the 
legislature’s intent in establishing the direct sellers’ exemption and 
prevent the loss of revenues resulting from the expanded interpretation 
of the exemption by amending [the statute] retroactively to conform the 
exemption to the original intent of the legislature.”188  Specifically, the 
exemption was amended retroactively to clarify that it was limited to 
persons engaged in the retail sale of only consumer products.189  
E. Judicial Review of the Retroactive Tax Legislation 
Subsequent to the enactment of the retroactive legislation, the 
Washington DOR denied Dot Foods’ claim for a tax refund for tax 
periods that were outside the tax periods at issue in the prior case, i.e., 
after April 2006.190  Dot Foods then sued again, this time claiming that 
the retroactive legislation was invalid under the Due Process Clause, and 
also that the legislation was invalid under the legal theories of separation 
 
 184. 372 P.3d at 748. 
 185. See 372 P. 3d at 750 (quoting Wash. Legislature, 2010 1st Spec. Sess., 61st Legislature, ch. 
23, § 401 (Wash. 2010); Brief in Opposition to Petition of Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
supra note 142, at 6. 
 186. See Wash. Legislature Laws 2010 1st Spec. Sess., 61st Legislature, ch. 23, § 401 (Wash. 
2010).  
 187. See id.   
 188. Id. (brackets added). The exemption was repealed entirely for future years.  See id. (brackets 
added) 
 189. In particular, the exemption was retroactively limited to:  
…a person who buys only consumer products on a buy-sell basis or a deposit-commission 
basis for resale, by the buyer or any other person, in the home or otherwise than in a 
permanent retail establishment, or who sells at retail, or solicits the sale at retail of, only 
consumer products in the home or otherwise than in a permanent retail establishment… 
Wash. Legislature, 2010 1st Spec. Sess., 61st Legislature, ch. 23, § 402 (Wash. 2010) (italicized terms 
mark the additions to the original statute).  Effectively, the revised statute codified the position that the 
state had taken — for a ten-year period — by regulation.  See supra notes 154-155 and accompanying 
text. 
 190. 372 P.3d at 749.  
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of powers and collateral estoppel.191  The suit pertained only to Dot 
Foods’ tax periods beginning May 2006, as the state of Washington had 
refunded the tax at issue in the prior case.192 Thus, the 2009 Dot Foods 
decision remained in force as to Dot Foods for those prior tax periods.  
Because of the retroactive legislation, however, no other entity would be 
able to submit a tax refund claim based upon the 2009 case for any 
period, and Dot Foods itself would be foreclosed from seeking refunds 
for the subsequent tax periods. 
In a letter opinion, a trial court granted summary judgment to the 
Washington DOR on Dot Foods’ separation of powers and collateral 
estoppels claims, but found in favor of the taxpayer under the Due 
Process Clause.193 Subsequently, a unanimous Washington Supreme 
Court reversed the trial court and upheld the 2010 retroactive statute on 
all counts.194   
1. Legitimate Legislative Purpose 
In evaluating Dot Foods’ due process challenge to the retroactive tax 
legislation, the Washington Supreme Court applied Carlton’s two-part 
test.  First, the court held that the amendment was for the legitimate 
legislative purposes of preventing the “large and devastating revenue 
losses” created by the court’s 2009 decision and for “restoring parity” 
between in-state and out-of-state sellers of consumer goods.195  The 
court stated that it was applying a similar rational basis analysis as it had 
in a case decided one year earlier, In re Estate of Hambleton,196 where 
the court also upheld a retroactive tax statute that reversed one of its 
prior decisions.197    
The court dismissed the taxpayer’s claim that because the legislature 
could not have known the 1983 legislature’s “original intent,” its 
asserted purpose was arbitrary and unreasonable.198  The court stated 
that the taxpayer’s suggested inquiry was inconsistent with the highly 
 
 191. Id. at 748. 
 192. See id at 749 (“Dot Foods negotiated a settlement with the Department for over 97 percent of 
the B & O taxes paid from January 2000 through April 2006”). 
 193. See generally id. at 749. 
 194. See 372 P.3d at 755. 
 195. Id. at 750. 
 196. 335 P.3d 398 (Wash. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 318 (2015).  In Hambleton, the Court 
upheld retroactive estate tax legislation that dated back eight years.  See id.  That legislation reversed a 
prior decision by the same court that would have created “an inequity never intended by the Legislature” 
since it “would [have] allow[ed] some estates to escape the tax while similarly situated estates would be 
subject to it.”  See id. at 404-05, 411. 
 197. See 372 P.3d at 750 n.2. The court noted that the trial court below had rendered its decision 
without the benefit of the court’s subsequent decision in Hambleton.   
 198. Id. at 751.  
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deferential Carlton test.199  The court also rejected the taxpayer’s claim 
that the asserted revenue losses have to be “unanticipated,” because it 
concluded there was no such requirement stated in Carlton.200  Finally, 
the court rejected the taxpayer’s claim that the legislature impermissibly 
“targeted” it within the meaning of Carlton simply because the 
legislature acted to reverse the analysis — though not the final decision 
favoring the company — in Dot Foods’ prior judicial victory.201   
2. Rational Means 
Second, the Washington Supreme Court concluded that the statute’s 
period of retroactivity was rationally related to its legislative purpose, as 
required by Carlton.202  The taxpayer argued that because the legislation 
amended a statute enacted in 1983, its retroactive period was 27 years 
and that this period rendered the statute unconstitutional under 
Carlton.203  In response, the court noted that the taxpayer’s asserted 
retroactive length was overstated.204  The court stated that although “it is 
true that the 2010 amendment theoretically dates back to the enactment 
under the plain language [of the law], the actual retroactive application 
of the amendment is necessarily limited by the particularities of the case 
as well as the applicable statute of limitations.”205 It noted that “[a]t 
issue here is whether the amendment, which went into effect on May 1, 
 
 199. Id. at 750-51. A specific criticism that has been made with respect to the case is that a 
retroactive state tax statute is somehow undermined when the legislators that are responsible for the 
statute are not substantially the same as those that were initially responsible for the statute. Brief Amicus 
Curiae of Council on State Taxation in Support of Petitioner, supra note 5, at 21-22 (stating that there 
was 100% turnover in the Washington legislature between 1983 and 2010); Brief for the Inst. for Prof’ls 
in Taxation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 5 at 21-22 (stating that all but one of 
the 147 members of the two houses of Washington’s legislature “moved on between the original passage 
of the statute and the 2010 amendments”). But this assumes that Carlton requires that later legislators 
have personal knowledge of the intentions of the earlier legislature, and Carlton stated no such 
requirement.  See 512 U.S. at 30-35.  Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Carlton, which was most 
sympathetic to the idea that there should be temporal limits imposed on retroactive tax statutes, 
specifically stated that even one year after the enactment of such laws the “subjective motivation” of the 
legislature is difficult to discern and logically irrelevant.  Id. at 36-37 (O’Connor, J., concurring).   
 200. 372 P.3d at 751.  
 201. Id. at 751. The court noted that a comparison of the estimated revenue cost of the amendment 
with the refund request of Dot Foods — the latter of which was only a very small component of the 
former — “support[ed] the conclusion that the legislature was not improperly targeting Dot Foods but 
was enacting a statute of general application.”  Id. at 751 n.3 (brackets added).  See supra notes 179-181 
and accompanying text.  The company retained the exemption for the tax years that were at issue in the 
case that it successfully litigated.  See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 202. 372 P.3d at 751-52. 
 203. Id. at 751 
 204. Id. at 751-52. 
 205. Id. at 751 (emphasis added).  The court noted that it is “the function – rather than the length – 
of a retroactivity period” that is key.  Id. at 752. 
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2010, applies retroactively to the May 2006 through December 2007 
interim tax periods.”206  Thus, the court concluded that “the retroactivity 
period as applied to Dot Foods is only four years.”207   
The court also noted that, in any event, Carlton imposed “no absolute 
temporal limitation on retroactivity.”208  It stated that “[w]hile there are 
certainly constitutional limits on how far back laws may reach, whether 
the length of a retroactivity period breaches that limit should be 
determined by a qualitative analysis of the law, not solely by a 
quantitative measurement of time.”209  The Court also noted the 
Supreme Court’s language in Welch v. Henry: “In each case it is 
necessary to consider the nature of the tax and the circumstances in 
which it is laid…”210 Lastly, relying upon its prior decision in 
Hambleton, the court noted that the “actual retroactive effect of the 
amendment as applied to Dot Foods was rationally related to the 
legislature’s legitimate state purpose” of “preventing the loss of 
revenues resulting from the expanded interpretation of the 
exemption.”211  Therefore, the retroactive tax statute met the 
requirements of the Due Process Clause.212   
 
 206. Id. at 751. 
 207. Id. (emphasis added). 
 208. Id. at 752. See also Temple Univ. v. United States, 769 F.2d 126, 135 (3d Cir. 1985) (“no 
federal court of appeals has yet adopted an absolute temporal limitation on retroactivity”), cert. denied, 
476 U.S. 1182 (1986)). 
 209. 372 P.3d at 751 (citing State v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 113 P.2d 542 (Wash. 1941)). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting LAWS OF 2010, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 23, § 401(4)) (brackets 
omitted)). 
 212. The Supreme Court has stated in the state tax context that “Due process centrally concerns 
the fundamental fairness of governmental activity.”  Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 
(1992).  But even applying this general concept, it is difficult to question the result in Dot Foods.  As 
has been noted, the taxpayer took a position that was opposed by the state’s Department of Revenue, 
and rejected by the trial court, the appeals court and four of the nine judges on the state supreme court.  
See supra notes 163-178 and accompanying text.  When the state supreme court found in favor of the 
taxpayer, 5-4 — reversing the determination reached by two lower courts — the state governor and the 
state legislature acted specifically and almost immediately to legislatively reverse that decision, and the 
state supreme court then unanimously upheld that legislation.  See supra notes 179-194 and 
accompanying text.  When one steps back from the nearly unanimous determinations made by each of 
the various components of Washington state government over the lifetime of the Dot Foods case, it 
seems hard to argue that this collective governmental consensus was unfair.  Compare U.S. CONST. 
amend V and amend. XIV, § 1 (Due Process Clause requires that a person not be “deprived of … 
property without due process of law”). The similar, consolidated Michigan cases for which the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari on the same day as Dot Foods, received similar, repeated state government 
consideration — with the various implicated state actors in that case also rejecting the taxpayers’ 
arguments with nearly unanimous antipathy.  See generally supra note 1 and notes 363-402 
accompanying text. 
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3. Separation of Powers; Collateral Estoppel  
The court also dismissed the taxpayer’s claim that the retroactive 
legislation violated separation of powers’ principles by infringing on a 
judicial function.213 It noted that there is no such violation where the 
legislature does not reverse a prior final decision ex post facto, and that 
the legislation did not curtail the judgment in the 2009 Dot Foods 
case.214  Similar determinations have been made in other cases 
evaluating retroactive state tax statutes that have reversed the analysis in 
a court decision.215   
Lastly, the court rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the 
Washington DOR was collaterally estopped from assessing taxes against 
it for tax periods that were not at issue in, and were  concluded prior to, 
the decision in the 2009 Dot Foods case.216  The court concluded that 
“tax appeals are very limited causes of action” and “tax appeals are 
confined to the specific taxes and associated time periods identified by 
the aggrieved taxpayer.”217   
III. ANALYSIS OF DOT FOODS AND CARLTON 
Some have argued that Dot Foods and the recent, similar state tax 
cases represent a particularly egregious application of a retroactive state 
tax statute, one that warrants re-consideration of the Carlton test.218  In 
fact, Dot Foods reveals the merits of the Carlton approach in the state 
tax context — particularly with respect to the generic, recurring fact 
pattern that was at issue in Dot Foods.  Unlike in Carlton, where the 
 
 213. 372 P.3d at 754. 
 214. Id. at 754-55.  
 215. See, e.g., Gillette Commer. Operations N. Am. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 878 N.W.2d 891, 912-
15 (Mich. App. 2015), rev. denied, 880 N.W.3d 230 (Mich. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017); 
In re Hambleton, 335 P.3d 398, 406-09 (2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 318 (2015); General Motors 
Corp. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 803 N.W.2d 698, 720 (Mich. 2010) (per curiam), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 
1178 (2012); Enterprise Leasing Co. of Phoenix v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 211 P.3d 1, 17 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2008); Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak, 860 NE 2d 246, 255-56 (Ill. 2006); King v. Campbell 
County, 217 S.W.3d 862, 870-71 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).  The claim that the legislative reversal of the 
analysis in a court case violates the separation of powers doctrine was also rejected in several federal 
court of appeals cases in the 1980’s pertaining to FICA taxes.  See generally Michael Reese Hosp. and 
Med. Ctr. v. United States, 684 F. Supp. 986, 990-91 (1988). These FICA tax cases are discussed in 
more detail supra notes 302-316 and accompanying text.  See also Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 
169 F.2d 254, 262 (2nd Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948) (no separation of powers issue 
where Congress retroactively reversed the analysis in several U.S. Supreme Court cases).  Battaglia is 
discussed in greater detail supra notes 317-323 and accompanying text. 
 216. 372 P.3d at 752-53. This would have been the tax periods commencing in April, 2006.  See 
id. at 749. 
 217. Id. at 753.  
 218. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.  
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retroactive statute was one that amended an unambiguous tax statute to 
foreclose a deduction previously permitted, Dot Foods, like other recent 
state tax cases, involved a situation where the legislature sought to 
clarify a tax statute that it concluded had been wrongly construed by the 
judiciary. 
As Dot Foods determined, the revised Washington statute met the 
Carlton test because there was a legitimate legislative purpose to 
remedy the consequences of a judicial decision that would result in 
“large and devastating revenue losses,” and there was no impermissible 
intent to “target” the taxpayer.219  Also, the legislation was rationally 
related to this purpose, in part because its “actual retroactive effect” was 
limited to the tax period for which the taxpayer could file refund claims 
under the 2009 Dot Foods decision.220   
Dot Foods repeatedly noted that the relevant inquiry under Carlton is 
a “rational basis” test,221 an inquiry that is highly deferential to state 
legislation.222  Perhaps in part because this is so, the court did not seek 
to further evaluate the distinctions between Dot Foods and Carlton.  
There are other important distinctions, however, between the two cases, 
discussed below, that further validate the court’s analysis. 
A. Reliance 
One important distinction between Carlton and Dot Foods is that the 
taxpayer in Carlton specifically relied upon an unambiguous tax 
incentive, with no knowledge at the time of this reliance that the 
provision would later be changed.  When Congress retroactively 
amended the law, the taxpayer lost not only the tax benefit, but the 
related costs incurred in seeking the incentive.223  The Ninth Circuit in 
Carlton broke with decades of prior Supreme Court precedent to find in 
favor of the taxpayer because of the taxpayer’s reliance interest.224  It 
 
 219. See supra notes 195-201 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra notes 202-212 and accompanying text. 
 221. 372 P.3d at 750-51 (referring to the rational basis standard seven times).   
 222. Id. at 750 (referring to the rational basis test as the “most relaxed form of judicial scrutiny,” 
one that results in judicial review that is “highly deferential”). 
 223. Laura Ricciardi, The Aftermath of United States v. Carlton: Taxpayers Will Have to Pay for 
Congress’s Mistakes, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 599, 634-35 (1996) (noting that the taxpayer lost 
$631,000 on the stock that he purchased and then resold in an attempt to obtain the federal deduction). 
 224. The taxpayer also had no notice of any forthcoming change to the statute. See supra notes 
115-116 and accompanying text.  In this section of this article, the taxpayer’s lack of notice is assumed 
to be one aspect of the taxpayer’s more general reliance on prior law.  See also Domsky, supra note 122, 
at 82 (1995) (noting that at the time of Carlton, “the United States Supreme Court, had since 1928, 
consistently upheld Congress’ retroactive tax measures.”); Weiler, supra note 91, at 1071-72 
(“Significantly, since the origination of the tax deference doctrine in 1938, the Supreme Court not only 
has never sustained a due process challenge to the retroactive application of a tax law, but, more 
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was that specific result that was, in turn, the reason that the Supreme 
Court accepted the case for review.   
Responding to the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, the Supreme Court in 
Carlton de-emphasized the circumstances where reliance — including 
lack of knowledge of a pending law change — is relevant to the 
determination of the validity of a retroactive tax statute.225  The Court 
suggested that a legislature cannot retroactively create a “wholly new 
tax,” but otherwise has wide discretion as to when and how to impose a 
retroactive tax.226 In the aftermath of Carlton, commentators debated the 
correctness of the Supreme Court’s determination.227  Some concluded 
that the Court’s deference to the legislature’s fiscal policy-making 
determinations could be unfair where a taxpayer specifically relied upon 
a prior tax statute;228  but others argued that the political process would 
generally operate to limit these situations.229  
The commentators’ colloquy in the aftermath of Carlton suggests that 
it is appropriate to revisit the goals and merits of that case.  But this re-
visitation is not implicated in a case like Dot Foods.  In Dot Foods, the 
tax exemption that was the basis for the taxpayer’s case was not clearly 
worded such that, for example, the taxpayer itself was uncertain as to 
whether it qualified for the exemption.230  Also, after the Washington 
DOR promulgated a regulation stating that Dot Foods was not entitled to 
the exemption, the company quarreled with the state for ten years 
claiming that it should be treated as exempt nonetheless.231  This 
litigation continued after the company lost two decisions in the 
Washington courts.232  Even the company’s ultimate victory at the 
Washington Supreme Court in 2009 was arguably not unequivocal, as it 
was 5-4, with the dissent calling the majority’s decision not merely 
wrong but “dangerous.”233   
 
remarkably, has not sustained a due process challenge to any retroactive economic law.”); Heather Lynn 
Gray, Carlton v. United States: An Analysis of Retroactive Tax Legislation, 24 STETSON L. REV. 765, 
769 n.26 (1995) (noting that “[h]istorically, courts have overwhelmingly upheld retroactive tax 
legislation against due process challenges,” and citing a long list of prior Supreme Court and federal 
cases). 
 225. See supra notes 115-124 and accompanying text. 
 226. 512 U.S. at 33-35.  See also Gunning, supra note 64, at 300 (2009) (noting that to the extent 
the reliance logic in the Court’s “[1920’s era] Nichols line of cases survives, it is limited to cases 
involving ‘wholly new tax[es], rather than amendments to existing tax schemes that retroactively impact 
prior transactions”) (brackets added).  
 227. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 228. See id. 
 229. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.   
 230. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (noting that because of its uncertainty, the 
taxpayer requested a letter ruling from the Washington DOR confirming its entitlement).  
 231. See supra notes 161-178 and accompanying text. 
 232. See id. 
 233. 215 P.3d at 193-94 (Stephens, J., dissenting).  See supra notes 175-178 and accompanying 
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More generally, the taxpayer in Dot Foods took no specific action in 
reliance on the Washington exemption, unlike the situation in Carlton.  
In Carlton, the taxpayer purchased stock that he would not otherwise 
have purchased, then sold that stock to a particular buyer — and thereby 
incurred a significant monetary loss — specifically to obtain a statutory 
deduction.234  In contrast, in Dot Foods there was no suggestion that the 
taxpayer’s day-to-day in-state commercial activities in any way 
depended upon the statutory exemption.  The company generated 
income from these efforts; certainly, it would have been happy to offset 
the tax due on this income with the exemption, but its actions were not 
dependent upon this result.235   
If, as numerous commentators have concluded, the primary concern 
with the Carlton rational basis test is that this test may not always be 
sufficiently sympathetic to taxpayer reliance interests,236 then, 
nonetheless, these concerns are irrelevant in a case like Dot Foods.  The 
taxpayer in Dot Foods had no such reliance interest.237 Similarly, if the 
specific concern with respect to retroactive tax statutes and reliance 
more generally is that certain taxpayers may not have sufficient 
legislative influence to oppose such measures, then this concern also is 
not implicated in a case like Dot Foods.  During the tax years at issue, 
Dot Foods was the largest food re-distributor in the United States, and 
the company and the other taxpayers ultimately impacted by the 
statute’s retroactive tax legislation apparently had significant lobbying 
clout.238   
 
text. 
 234. See supra notes 41-48 and 223 and accompanying text. 
 235. Therefore, the situation in Dot Foods was not as sympathetic as that of the estate taxpayer 
discussed in Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938) or later considered by the Ninth Circuit in Carlton v. 
United States, 972 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1992), rev’d, 512 U.S. 26 (1994). An estate taxpayer may be 
sympathetic where it makes a gift as a voluntary act to take advantage of an unambiguous deduction 
with no knowledge that the tax law will be subsequently changed, in a context in which the taxpayer 
would not necessarily have undertaken the act if it had known that the tax change was forthcoming.  See 
Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. at 148; Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d at 1058, rev’d, 512 U.S. 26.  In 
contrast, Dot Foods pertained to an income-based tax, which is not comparable to an estate or gift tax, 
because the courts “cannot assume that stockholders would refuse to receive corporate dividends [or 
income] even if they knew that their receipt would later be subjected to a new tax or to the increase of 
an old one.”  See id. (brackets added).  See also U.S. v. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 40 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(drawing a distinction between the “case of a tax incentive provision, as opposed to a tax on a 
continuous activity (like the earning of income)” since in the former case there may be reliance upon the 
incentive). 
 236. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 237. See generally notes 144-168 and accompanying text.   
 238. See supra notes 134 and 144 and accompanying text.   
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B. Actual Retroactive Effect 
Another important distinction between Dot Foods and Carlton 
pertains to the means of measurement of the length of a tax statute’s 
retroactivity.  As the Washington Supreme Court noted in Dot Foods, 
whether a retroactive tax statute is rationally related to a legitimate 
legislative purpose implies some consideration of this retroactive 
period.239  But as the court also noted, that evaluation is one that 
requires a consideration of the specific context in which the law operates 
and its “actual retroactive effect.”240   
Dot Foods argued — and some persons have recently claimed — that 
the retroactive tax statute extended backwards an impermissibly long 27 
years.241  It was this point in particular that has caused some to argue 
that Dot Foods suggests an especially egregious instance of a retroactive 
tax statute.242  But the court in Dot Foods concluded that, although the 
retroactive amendment amended a statute that was enacted 27 years 
earlier, the “retroactivity period as applied to Dot Foods is only four 
years” (i.e., the open period of Dot Foods’ statute of limitations).243  
This was careful language that may have been intended to suggest that 
not only was the statute’s retroactive effect — as to the taxpayer, Dot 
Foods — significantly shorter than the claimed 27 years, but that also 
the retroactivity period as applied to all other affected taxpayers was 
even shorter than the period as applied to Dot Foods.   
Dot Foods’ effort against the Washington DOR with respect to the 
direct sellers’ exemption was not only lengthy, it was solitary.  In 1997, 
the company requested and received a private letter ruling confirming its 
entitlement to the exemption conferred by the 1984 legislation.244  Two 
years later, the state revoked the letter ruling and promulgated a 
 
 239. 372 P.3d at 751-52.  
 240. Id. at 751-752 (evaluating the statute’s “actual retroactive application” and stating the court’s 
conclusion with respect to the statute’s “actual retroactive effect”).  Cf. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 33-34 
(evaluating the statute’s “actual retroactive effect” and noting that the statute’s “period of retroactive 
effect” was limited). 
 241. 372 P.3d at 751 (noting Dot Foods’ contention “that a 27-year retroactivity period is per se 
unconstitutional”).  In their amicus briefs filed in support of Dot Foods’ certiorari petition as filed with 
the Supreme Court, the organizations, COST, TEI, IPT and ACTA each claimed that the period of the 
tax statute’s retroactivity was 27 years, despite the fact that the Washington Supreme Court, the very 
court whose 2009 decision each of these organizations sought to reinstate, concluded that this period 
was no more than 4 years.  See generally the Dot Foods amicus briefs cited at supra notes 5, 9. 
 242. See generally the Dot Foods amicus briefs cited at supra notes 5, 9. 
 243. 372 P.3d at 751 (emphasis added).  The court made two other references to the period of 
retroactivity being “as applied” to Dot Foods.  See id. at 752.  There were no other taxpayers claiming 
the exemption that were of record at the time of the court’s decision.  See infra note 181 and 
accompanying text.    
 244. See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text. 
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corrective regulation, which Dot Foods refused to follow.245  In the 
aftermath of that refusal, Dot Foods embarked upon years of litigation 
with the state, culminating in three decisions — none of which included 
any reference to any other taxpayers that were asserting a similar 
position.246  Presumably, when the state promulgated its regulation in 
1999 other similarly-situated taxpayers followed it, particularly since 
that regulation was twice upheld by the Washington courts, in 2006 and 
2007.247  Therefore, it seems apparent that no taxpayer other than Dot 
Foods had a similar claim until the time of the 2009 Dot Foods decision 
— which was legislatively reversed 7 months later.248  This, in turn, 
suggests that the actual retroactive effect of that legislation for every 
similarly-situated taxpayer other than Dot Foods was only seven 
months, i.e., the time period measured from the date of the 2009 Dot 
Foods decision to that of the 2010 statutory amendment — 
approximately half the period of the actual retroactive effect of the tax 
statute at issue in Carlton.249    
Also, and more significantly, the Washington legislation had no 
practical impact at all with respect to the affected taxpayers’ actual 
activities prior to the 2009 Dot Foods case because all the statute did 
was codify the regulatory position of the Washington DOR that 
constituted the pertinent law during that prior time.  Unlike in Carlton, 
the retroactive legislation neither required affected taxpayers to pay 
additional tax in connection with completed transactions nor caused 
taxpayers to lose funds expended to obtain a tax benefit that was then 
rescinded.250  These taxpayers engaged in in-state business activity 
during the period prior to the Dot Foods case without knowing that they 
might be later entitled to a refund, and the later Washington legislation 
merely confirmed that no refund would be forthcoming.251  Therefore, 
there is no apparent basis on which to claim that the Washington 
legislation had any actual retroactive effect as to taxpayers other than 
 
 245. See supra notes 154-162 and accompanying text. 
 246. See supra notes 163-178 and accompanying text 
 247. See supra notes 163-168 and accompanying text.  The Washington appeals court decision in 
Stroh Brewery Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 15 P.3d 692 (Wash. Ct of App., 2001), rev. denied, 29 P.3d 718 
(2001), had also implicitly upheld the Department’s position. See supra note 157 and accompanying 
text.   
 248. See supra notes 179-189 and accompanying text. 
 249. Cf. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 33 (“the actual retroactive effect of the 1987 amendment extended 
for a period only slightly greater than one year”).  See Brief in Opposition to Petition of Writ of 
Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, supra note 142, at 19 (“since the Legislature amended the law 
within months of the Dot Foods I decision, taxpayers had no longstanding reliance on the unexpected 
windfall of the Court’s decision”). 
 250. Compare Carlton, 512 U.S. at 28-29.   
 251. Unlike in Carlton, there was no arguable claim that the taxpayers engaged in this business 
activity to obtain the tax benefit.  See supra notes 234-235 and accompanying text.   
37
Fatale: Connecting the Dot: Retroactive State Tax Statutes Revisit United
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
70 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86 
Dot Foods, at least prior to the time of the Dot Foods decision.      
Some have argued in favor of a bright-line limit with respect to the 
applicable period of a retroactive tax statute.252  But as suggested by Dot 
Foods, such a limit would have the difficulty that — contrary to Carlton 
and its important predecessor case, Welch v. Henry253 — it would not be 
responsive to the context of a particular enactment.254  Moreover, Dot 
Foods suggests that blindly assuming that the actual retroactive effect of 
a retroactive tax statute dates back to the date of enactment of the statute 
that is amended will prove incorrect in certain circumstances.  Further, 
this assumption will be a particular problem in any case in which 
retroactive tax legislation seeks to override or “cure” a questionable 
court decision that construes a statute, because that decision will 
generally post-date the statute that it construes by a significant period of 
years.255    
C. Curative, Ratifying Legislation  
A third important difference between Dot Foods and Carlton pertains 
to the specific “curative” aspect of the retroactive tax legislation in Dot 
 
 252. See, e.g., Petition For a Writ of Certiorari at 21,  Dot Foods, Inc. v. State of Washington, 137 
S. Ct. 2156 (2017) (No. 16-308), 2016 WL 4728801 at *21 (“the Carlton test surely cannot be satisfied 
where the period of retroactivity is several years”); Brief of Amicus Curiae of Council on State Taxation 
in Support of Petitioners at 10-13, Hambleton v. Washington Dep’t of Revenue, 136 S. Ct. 318 (2015) 
(No. 14-1436),  2015 WL 4572748 at *13 (arguing that “indefinite” periods of tax retroactivity should 
be proscribed and that the Court should provide “clarification on the permissible length of retroactive 
tax legislation”).  See also Gunning, supra note 64, at 293 (proposing “that a presumptive line be drawn 
at the year preceding the legislative session in which the subject tax is enacted”); Zaber, 789 N.W.2d at 
653-654 (noting the taxpayer’s argument that retroactive tax statutes should be subject to a one year 
bright line limit).  But see Temple Univ. v. United States, 769 F.2d 126, 135 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
476 U.S. 1182 (1986) (“no federal court of appeals has yet adopted an absolute temporal limitation on 
retroactivity”). 
 253. 305 U.S. 134 (1938). 
 254. See supra notes 79-80 and 108-110 and accompanying text. 
 255. It is also possible that there will be instances where taxpayers might want to work with a 
state to pass retroactive legislation, and in these cases a bright line rule could prove problematic.  See 
Jennifer McLoughlin, Partnership Audit Bill Surfaces in Georgia, BNA Weekly State Tax Report, Feb. 
10, 2017 (citing comments of a representative of COST, which sought Supreme Court review of the 
2016 Dot Foods decision, see supra note 5 and accompanying text, that “while COST opposes 
retroactive tax legislation,” it could support retroactive tax legislation  that “will only impose a 
procedural change”); Shirley Sicilian, Retroactive Tax Legislation — Considering Both Sides of the 
Sword, 26 Journal of Multistate Tax’n and Incentives 37 (Mar./Apr. 2006) (noting that “retroactive tax 
laws can also work in favor of taxpayers” and citing some specific instances where this could be true); 
Roin, supra note 182, at 563 (arguing that current year taxpayers should sometimes support the 
imposition of retroactive taxes on prior year taxpayers, when those prior year taxpayers received the 
benefit of government overspending but were not responsible for their fair share of the government’s 
spending costs).  See also Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2nd Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 
335 U.S. 887 (1948), discussed infra notes 317-323 and accompanying text (case in which the 
retroactive economic legislation extinguished dollar claims against both private parties and the U.S. 
government). 
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Foods.  “A curative act is a statute passed to cure defects in prior law, or 
to validate legal proceedings, instruments, or acts of public or private 
administrative authorities.”256 Carlton referred to the retroactive statute 
at issue in that case as being a form of a curative statute.257  However, 
the statute at issue in Dot Foods reflected a different type of such statute 
— one that reinstates the legal status quo — and in these cases the 
deference to the statute should be even greater in certain respects. 
Curative legislation generally includes the circumstance where a 
legislative act is intended to reverse a questionable judicial decision258 
or to “remedy mistakes and defects in the administration of 
government.”259  This legislation often seeks to “ratif[y] a long-standing 
policy and [bring] the tax code in line with [persons’] expectations.”260  
Such curative, ratifying legislation may be intended to prevent the 
refund of government monies previously collected,261 or to create parity 
between different classes of persons, such that the application of the law 
 
 256. See Zabar, 789 N.W.2d at 644 (quoting 2 Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 41:11, at 503 (7th ed. 2009); Graham & Foster v. 
Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 426-427 (1931) (noting also a prior case, Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Bd. Of 
Comm’r, 258 U.S. 338 (1922), “where the court recognized there is a class of cases in which defects in 
the administration of the law may be cured by subsequent legislation without encroaching upon a 
constitutional right”).  See also Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of 
Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 703-706 (1960) (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
favorable treatment of “curative statutes,” generally those that “ratify prior official conduct of 
government officers who acted without the requisite authority” or are “designed to cure defects in an 
administrative system”). 
 257. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 31. 
 258. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992) (upholding a 
retroactive statute that reversed a decision of a state supreme court where the statute “was to correct the 
unexpected results” that derived from that case).  See Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive 
Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 97, 133-134, 158 (1998) (referencing 
Romein, 503 U.S. 181, as reflective of a class of retroactive statutes where the legislature “justifies 
retroactivity as ‘curative’ of unexpected interpretations of prior law” and noting that such situations 
have included “situations in which the legislature was responding quickly to an unanticipated judicial 
construction”).  See the discussion of Romein, infra notes 281-301 and accompanying text. 
 259. Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 427 (1931) (ratifying the collection of taxes that 
were improperly collected after the taxpayers’ statutes of limitation had run). See Schultz, supra note 
128, at 777-778 (citing Goodcell for the proposition that “when a legislative mistake gives a taxpayer a 
right to recover money from the Government, Congress may retroactively eliminate this right with a 
curative statute”). See the discussion of Goodcell, infra notes 324-332 and accompanying text. 
 260. New England Baptist Hospital v. United States, 807 F.2d 280, 285 (1986) (brackets added).  
See also Zaber, 789 N.W.2d at 645 (noting the purpose of curative legislation “to sustain the reliability 
of officials’ actions and secure expectations formed in reliance thereof”) (quoting 2 Norman J. Singer & 
J.D. Shambie Singer, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 41:11, at 506 (7th ed. 
2009)). 
 261. Zaber, 789 N.W.2d at 646 (noting that “the curative act at issue here was designed to avoid 
the refund of monies already collected and spent”). See also id. at 645-646 (noting curative legislation as 
to tax matters may be necessary “in order to safeguard the public treasury against the erosion of 
revenues”) (quoting 2 Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION, § 41:17, at 521 (7th ed. 2009)). 
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will be even-handed.262  In these cases, “no settled rights [are] disturbed 
nor expectations defeated.”263  Therefore — given the respect due to the 
fiscal determinations made by legislative and executive policy-makers 
— there is generally no cognizable claim of due process unfairness.264  
Moreover, the individual who claims that a vested right has arisen from 
an inadvertent defect in a statute or its administration may be “seeking a 
windfall since, had the legislature’s or administrator’s action had the 
effect it was intended to and could have, no right would have arised.”265 
Consequently, “the purpose of curative, ratifying legislation is sufficient 
to justify longer periods of retroactivity in contrast to the so-called 
modest period of retroactivity accorded the imposition of a new tax.”266  
Dot Foods involved a type of such “curative, ratifying legislation.” 
The retroactive statute in Dot Foods was intended to reinstate the 
interpretation of a longstanding state regulation, which had twice been 
upheld by the state courts.267  Also, the statute was intended to reverse 
the effect of a state supreme court decision that was partially predicated 
on a prior erroneous position that had been briefly taken by state 
 
 262. General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191-192 (1992) (noting that the retroactive 
legislation reversing a court case was justifiable in part because it equalized the payments made by 
employers who had “gambled” on the court case with those made by employers who had not). Romein 
cited United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 64-65 (1989), for the proposition that it is “legitimate 
to legislate retrospectively in order to ensure that similarly situated persons bear similar financial 
burdens of [sic] program.”  Id. 
 263. Laura Ricciardi & Michael B.W. Sinclair, Retroactive Civil Legislation, 27 U. Tol. L.Rev. 
301, 345 (1996).  See id. at 338 (“Such curative legislation affirms as proper what everyone had taken to 
be the law anyway: it restores a situation that was affirmatively anticipated and provided for.”).  
 264. See Fisch, supra note 128, at 1010 (noting with approval “the general tolerance for 
retroactive application of corrective or curative legislation”); Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of 
Retroactive Legislation, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 415, 468-70 (1982) (stating that “[c]urative acts are statutes 
that retroactively adjust existing legislation to the putative intent of the legislature” — statutes that “are 
routinely upheld,” and opining that such legislation “should probably be upheld. It tends to confirm 
expectations and to protect those who rely on the underlying merits of a claim rather than grasp at legal 
technicalities.”); W. David Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive 
Lawmaking, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 216, 238 (1960) (“The [United States Supreme] Court has almost always 
upheld ‘curative’ legislation designed to restore what was believed to have been the status quo.”).  
 265. Hochman, supra note 256, at 705. 
 266. Zaber, 789 N.W.2d at 645.  The principle has been broadly recognized by different courts. 
See, e.g., Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 426-430 (1930)); Canisius College v. United 
States, 799 F.2d 18, 27 (2d. Cir. 1986) (“In light of its curative purpose, we find the provision 
constitutional notwithstanding the long period of retroactivity”); Wiggins v. Comm’r of Internal 
Revenue, 904 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir.1990) (“Where legislation is curative, retroactive application may 
be constitutional despite a long period of retroactivity”); Zaber, 789 N.W.2d at 645-47 (same) (quoting 
Wiggins, 904 F.2d at 316).  
 267. See supra notes 154-168 and 186-189 and accompanying text. The regulation at issue was an 
interpretative regulation.  See Dot Foods, 215 P.3d 185 at 193-194. Such rules “are de facto 
authoritative for the public until the public challenges them in court and the court agrees.” See Ass'n of 
Wash. Bus. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 120 P.3d 46, 54 (Wash. 2005).  See also id. at 446-447 (discussing the 
difference between legislative and interpretive agency regulations in the state of Washington).   
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revenue officials.268 No “settled expectations” were disrupted by the 
retroactive legislation in Dot Foods in part because only one taxpayer —
Dot Foods — received a “private” letter ruling to the effect that it could 
take advantage of the relevant exemption on the facts at issue,269 which 
was the position that the retroactive legislation later disavowed.  Also, 
the state had a regulatory statement in place concerning the exemption 
for ten years prior to the state supreme court case that rejected this 
statement, and that position was twice upheld by the lower state 
courts.270  The claim in Dot Foods pertained only to the taxpayer, and it 
was not until the taxpayer ultimately prevailed at the state supreme court 
that the prospect of refunds for a more general class of taxpayers 
manifested.271  It was this prospective event that the state foreclosed 
through retroactive legislation seven months later; Dot Foods itself was 
granted a refund for the tax period at issue in its case.272  Therefore, 
taxpayers in general had “no longstanding reliance on the unexpected 
windfall of the [Dot Foods] decision.”273  
In these respects, Dot Foods differed from Carlton. Carlton stated 
that the statute challenged in that case “was adopted as a curative 
measure.”274 That characterization, however, seemed intended to 
distinguish the specific situation in that case — where Congress 
amended an unambiguous pre-existing statute — from the enactment of 
a “wholly new tax.”275 The Court’s purpose in Carlton was to ensure 
that almost all forms of retroactive tax legislation would be subjected to 
deferential rational basis review.276  While the Carlton test is 
permissive, there is nonetheless a potentially important difference 
between the facts of Carlton, where Congress retroactively imposed tax 
on a past transaction where no tax would otherwise have been due, and 
“legislative ratification of a tax that has been previously assessed and 
collected.”277  Settled transactions or expectations will be disturbed in 
the former case but not the latter, and greater deference is, therefore, due 
in the latter case.278 
 
 268. See supra notes 151-153 and 169-174 accompanying text. 
 269. See supra notes 244-249 and accompanying text. 
 270. See id. 
 271. See supra notes 179-181 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 273. Brief in Opposition to Petition of Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, supra note 
142, at 19.  See supra notes 244-249 and accompanying text.  
 274. 512 U.S. at 31. 
 275. Id. at 31-34. 
 276. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. 
 277. See generally Zaber, 789 N.W.2d at 642-645 (concluding that “the amendment at issue in 
Carlton was not a curative act, as that term of art is used in the context of retroactivity”). 
 278. See, e.g., Zaber, 789 N.W.2d at 645-647 (“where legislation is curative, retroactive 
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D. Similar Cases that Pre-date Carlton 
One of the virtues of Carlton is that the case posited a flexible inquiry 
that recognized that the validity of a retroactive tax statute depends upon 
the specific context of the legislation and the “actual retroactive effect” 
of the statute reviewed.  The contexts involving a retroactive tax statute 
can be very different, as the comparison between the facts in Carlton 
and Dot Foods reveals.  While the legislative circumstances in Carlton 
were different from those in Dot Foods, Carlton was decided against a 
backdrop of divergent precedent that no doubt informed the Court’s 
flexible standard.  Some of those cases, as in Dot Foods, were cases in 
which either Congress or a state sought to legislatively overturn a 
judicial decision using curative, ratifying legislation.279  In such cases, 
because the legislation did not upset settled expectations and merely 
reinstated the legal status quo, there was little or no actual retroactive 
effect within the meaning of Carlton.280  Some of those cases are 
discussed in greater detail below.  
1. General Motors Corp. v. Romein 
The Supreme Court’s decision in General Motors Corp. v. Romein281 
suggests that greater deference is afforded to curative, ratifying tax 
statutes.  Romein pertained to workers’ compensation payments, not tax 
imposition, but Carlton likened the retroactivity analysis to be applied in 
the tax context to that applied to economic statutes more generally.282  
Also, Romein was decided only two years before Carlton, so the Court 
presumptively had the prior case in mind.  Justice O’Connor, the author 
of Romein, specifically cited Romein in her later concurrence in 
Carlton.283  
The Michigan Legislature enacted a statute in 1987 that required 
petitioners, General Motors Corporation (“GM”) and the Ford Motor 
 
application may be constitutional despite a long period of retroactivity”) (quoting Wiggins v. Comm’r of 
Internal Revenue, 904 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir.1990)). 
 279. See infra notes 281-332 and accompanying text. 
 280. See Ricciardi & Sinclair, supra note 263, at 345 (observing that there is judicial precedent 
pertaining to retroactive “curative legislation … which made the law conform retroactively to what 
people had mistakenly relied upon” and stating that “[i]t follows that where there is no reliance on the 
law of the moment, a retroactive change will do no harm”).  One scholar has argued that typically 
retroactive tax statutes that are limited to a taxpayer’s open statute of limitations — in most cases either 
three or six years — should be permissible “since it is hard to argue that anyone can have ‘settled 
expectations’ regarding their tax liability until that year’s statute of limitations for tax adjustments has 
closed.” See Roin, supra note 182, at 597-598. 
 281. See General Motors Corp, 503 U.S. 181 (1991). 
 282. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 30. 
 283. Id. at 36 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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Company (“Ford”), to repay workers’ compensation benefits that the 
companies had withheld relying on a 1981 state workers’ compensation 
statute.284  The 1981 statute allowed employers to decrease workers' 
compensation benefits to those disabled employees eligible to receive 
wage-loss compensation from other employer-funded sources (so-called 
“benefit coordination”).285   The “benefit coordination provision did not 
specify whether it was to be applied to workers injured before its 
effective date, March 31, 1982.”286  GM and Ford both took the 
“position that the 1981 law allowed them to reduce workers’ 
compensation benefits to workers injured before March 31, 1982,” when 
these persons were receiving benefits from other sources.287  Other 
similarly-situated employers did not take this same position.288   
GM and Ford subsequently contested lawsuits brought by individuals 
seeking workers’ compensation benefits who had been injured prior to 
the enactment of the Michigan law. The lower Michigan adjudications 
disagreed with the companies’ interpretation of the 1981 statute, holding 
that coordination was allowed only for employees injured after 1982.289 
However, in 1985 the Michigan Supreme Court, in Chambers v. 
General Motors Corp.,290 ruled in favor of GM and Ford.291 After that 
decision, employers who had not coordinated benefits for employees 
injured before 1982 began to demand reimbursement from those 
employees.292 The Michigan legislature responded immediately, 
initiating legislation that would retroactively amend the 1981 statute and 
effectively overturn the state supreme court decision.293  The Michigan 
legislature enacted legislation 19 months later, in 1987, which resulted 
in a retroactive statute with actual impact dating back six years.294  As a 
result of the 1987 statute GM and Ford were ordered to refund nearly 
$25 million to disabled employees.295  
GM and Ford again brought suit, this time claiming that Michigan’s 
 
 284. Romein, 503 U.S. at 183. 
 285. Id. at 184. 
 286. Id.  
 287. Id.  
 288. See id. at 185-186. 
 289. Id. at 184 (citing Franks v. White Pine Copper Div., Copper Range Co., 332 N.W.2d 447, 
449 (1982)). 
 290. Franks v. White Pine Copper Div., Copper Range Co., 375 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Mich. 1985). 
 291. 503 U.S. at 185 (citing Chambers v. General Motors Corp., 375 N.W.2d 715, decided with 
Franks v. White Pine, 375 N.W.2d 715 (1985)). The court held that the benefit coordination provision 
applied to all payment periods after its effective date, regardless of the date the employee had been 
injured. Id. 
 292. Id.  
 293. Id. at 185-186. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. at 186. 
43
Fatale: Connecting the Dot: Retroactive State Tax Statutes Revisit United
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
76 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86 
retroactive legislation violated the Due Process Clause.296 The Michigan 
Supreme Court upheld the legislation and the U.S. Supreme Court 
affirmed.297  The Supreme Court remarked that retroactive legislation 
has the potential difficulty that “it can deprive citizens of legitimate 
expectations and upset settled transactions.’298 In dismissing the due 
process challenge, the Court stressed that the “purpose of the 1987 
statute was to correct the unexpected results of the Michigan Supreme 
Court's Chambers opinion.”299  The Court noted that the legislation 
“equalized the payments made by employers who had gambled on the 
Chambers decision with those made by employers who had not.”300  
Although the court did not use the terms, it treated the legislation as both 
curative and ratifying in nature.301   
2. Mid-1980’s Federal Court of Appeals FICA Cases  
Similar to Romein, a series of mid-1980’s federal court of appeals 
cases pertained to Federal Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”) 
taxes.302  In each instance, the taxpayer, relying on a 1965 IRS revenue 
 
 296. Id. The petitioners made an unsuccessful contract clause argument as well.  See id. at 186-
191. 
 297. Id. at 186.  
 298. Id. at 191. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. at 190-191. The Court referred to United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 64-65 
(1989), citing the case for the proposition that it is “legitimate to legislate retrospectively in order to 
ensure that similarly situated persons bear similar financial burdens of [the] program.” Id. at 192 
(brackets added). 
 301. See Weiler, supra note 91, at 1081 (the Court “effectively treated the retroactive legislation 
as curative in nature and held that the approximately six-year period of retroactivity was a rational 
means of achieving the legitimate objective of correcting a court's unexpected interpretation of a law”).  
A somewhat analogous case, decided by the Ninth Circuit after Carlton, is Montana Rail Link, Inc. v. 
United States, 76 F.3d 991 (1996).  In that case, the court upheld the retroactive application of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (“1989 OBRA”) to employer retirement contributions 
made to employees pursuant to the Railroad Retirement Tax Act (“RRTA”) in 1987 and 1988. See id. 
The employers had treated the contributions as taxable based upon their interpretation of the statute, but 
were later told by the governmental agency charged with enforcing the Act that these tax payments were 
made in error.  Id. at 993.  The employers began to refund the taxes to their employees and prepared to 
seek a federal tax refund. Id. Congress then acted to retroactively bar the refund claims. Congress’s 
rationale was in part that, without the period of retroactivity, the railroad workers’ retirement funds and 
benefits would have been jeopardized.  Id. Indeed, some employees had already received benefits based 
on the amounts paid into the funds and credited to the accounts for the period in issue.  Id. Although the 
employer-petitioner only challenged the retroactive application of the 1989 OBRA to its refund claims 
for tax years 1987 and 1988, the Act retroactively barred refund claims back to 1983, a period of up to 
seven years. Id. at 992-994. In upholding the retroactive application of the 1989 OBRA, the Ninth 
Circuit focused on the harm Congress attempted to prevent in protecting the retirement funds of the 
railroad workers and concluded that the 1989 OBRA met the two-part Carlton test.  Id. at 994. 
 302. See Canisius College v. United States, 799 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 
1014, (1987); Temple University v. United States, 769 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 
1182 (1986); New England Baptist Hosp. v. United States, 807 F.2d 280 (1st Cir. 1986). 
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ruling, paid FICA taxes on amounts contributed to a voluntary salary 
reduction annuity plan administered for its employees.303  In 1981, the 
Supreme Court concluded in Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United States, 304 
however, that the reasoning in the IRS ruling was an incorrect 
interpretation of the statute.305  
In 1983, Congress, concerned about the impact of Rowan on taxes 
previously collected, passed a law that in effect amended the governing 
statute to make it consistent with the 1965 revenue ruling.306 In 1984, 
Congress made the 1983 statute effective for tax years prior to 1983 “to 
preclude the possibility of refunds of FICA taxes paid in conformity 
with [the revenue ruling] on amounts contributed under [the] salary 
reduction plans.”307  As one court noted, Congress effectively 
“overruled [the Supreme Court] holding and codified Rev. Rul. 65-208 
— a ruling that had been applied and enforced for over fifteen years.”308   
In each of the court of appeals’ cases, the appellant sought a refund of 
the taxes paid on the theory that the federal statute was impermissibly 
retroactive under the Due Process Clause.309  As the refund requests in 
each of the cases dated back to 1979 or 1980, the retroactive reach of the 
legislation was four to five years.310  The First, Second and Third 
Circuits each rejected the appellant’s argument.311 The courts held that 
the retroactive application of the legislation was not unconstitutional 
because it was not arbitrary and irrational, i.e., it merely ratified long-
standing policy and brought the tax code in line with the appellants’ 
expectations at the time they paid the taxes.312  The Second and Third 
Circuits both specifically noted the fact that the legislation was curative 
in its character.313  The First Circuit stated, “Legislation that merely 
 
 303. See generally id. 
 304. 452 U.S. 247 (1981). 
 305. See id. 
 306. New England Baptist Hospital, 807 F.2d at 283; Canisius College, 799 F.2d at 22-24; 
Temple University, 769 F.2d at 129. 
 307. Canisius College, 799 F.2d at 24 (brackets added).  
 308. Temple, 769 F.2d at 135.  The case facts — the legislative codification of an administrative 
position previously struck down by the courts — resemble the facts in Dot Foods.  See supra notes 186-
189 and accompanying text. 
 309. See generally Canisius College, 799 F.2d at 19-22; Temple University, 769 F.2d at 127-129; 
New England Baptist Hosp., 807 F.2d at 281. 
 310. Id. 
 311. New England Baptist Hosp. v. United States, 807 F.2d 280, 284-85 (1st Cir. 1986). 
 312. For example, New England Baptist Hospital noted that “Congress’ 1984 enactment ratified 
long-standing Treasury policy” and “therefore, brought the tax code in line with the Hospital’s 
expectations at the time it withheld and paid the taxes.” 807 F.2d at 285. 
 313. Canisius stated that “[i]n light of its curative purpose, we find the provision constitutional 
notwithstanding the long period of retroactivity.”  799 F.2d at 27 (the case stated also that “curative 
legislation is typically entitled to be liberally construed”).  Temple remarked that “when such legislation 
is ‘curative’ in character, as in this instance, the retroactive application is typically entitled to be 
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validates a prior tax collection is less likely to violate the principles of 
due process than legislation that retroactively imposes a tax that had not 
been anticipated.”314 The court further stated that the appellant 
“complied with the Treasury's ruling and apparently did not have reason 
to believe that it might be incorrect until the Supreme Court decided 
Rowan in 1982.”315 The Supreme Court later denied certiorari for both 
the Second and Third Circuit cases.316   
3. Battaglia v. General Motors Corp. 
Also similar to Romein and the mid-1980’s federal FICA tax cases is 
Battaglia v. General Motors Corp.317  Battaglia pertained to a series of 
lawsuits brought by employees against a defendant-employer to recover 
overtime pay.318  The basis for the claims was three U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions that construed the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to require 
that overtime pay be provided in connection with activities that were not 
directly work-related, so-called “portal-to-portal” time.319   
 
liberally construed.” 769 F.2d at 134.   
 314. New England Baptist Hospital, 807 F.2d at 285. 
 315. Id. See also Robert Morris College v. United States, 11 Cl.Ct. 546, 547 (Cl.Ct. 1987) 
(reaching a similar conclusion as to the same issue). There were also other lower federal court cases that 
similarly rejected these refund claims.  See Michael Reese Hosp. and Medical Center v. United States, 
684 F. Supp. 986, 991 n.3 (1988) (citing cases). Another similar case is Long v. United States IRS, 742 
F.2d 1173 (Ct. App, 9th Cir. 1984).  In Long, the Ninth Circuit reviewed an Act of Congress that 
retroactively overruled that court’s prior determination that certain IRS information concerning audit 
techniques was subject to public disclosure.  See id.  The court upheld the legislation because “Congress 
never intended to permit [the] public disclosure” of the information.  Id. at 1183. The court noted that 
courts “have consistently upheld the retroactive application of ‘curative’ legislation which corrects 
defects subsequently discovered in a statute and which restores what Congress had always believed the 
law to be.”  Id. 
 316. See Canisius College v. United States, 799 F.2d 18, 26-27 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 
U.S. 1014, (1987); Temple University v. United States, 769 F.2d 126, 135 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
476 U.S. 1182 (1986). In the later Ninth Circuit decision in Carlton, the dissent — which reached a 
conclusion that was then later adopted by the Supreme Court, see U.S. v. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 30, 32-
35— cited the 1980’s FICA cases in support of its result.  See 972 F.2d at 1064 (Norris, J., dissenting) 
(citing New England Baptist Hospital, 807 F.2d at 285; Canisius College, 799 F.2d at 26-27; and 
Temple University, 769 F.2d at 135). In citing these cases, the Ninth Circuit dissent noted that, as 
compared to retroactive taxes more generally, “[c]urative legislation, passed to effectuate the original 
intent of Congress, has been granted greater leeway.” Id. 
 317. 169 F.2d 254 (2nd Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948). 
 318. Id. at 255-256. 
 319. Id. at 255, 258. The three Supreme Court decisions in 1944, 1945, and 1946 that brought 
about the later retroactive legislation were Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946); 
Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, 325 U.S. 161 (1945); and Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. 
v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944)). See George C. Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 
Duke L.J. 747, 755 n.30.  These cases generally held that the “work week” for miners included the time 
traveling from the mouth of the mine to the drill site and back (from “portal-to-portal”) and that, 
therefore, thousands of miners were entitled to significant overtime pay under the FLSA. See Stephen I. 
Vladeck, Federal Courts, Practice & Procedure: Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the 
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In the aftermath of the three Supreme Court cases, a large volume of 
back-year liability claims were filed.  Nearly 25% of this potential 
liability would have been borne by the U.S. Government.320  In 1947, 
Congress retroactively amended FLSA to eliminate the retroactive 
claims.321  Upon subsequent review, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Battaglia upheld the retroactive statute, thereby 
extinguishing the claims.  Battaglia justified the retroactive law by 
noting that Congress had found that “the liabilities created by the 
Supreme Court decisions … were ‘wholly unexpected’ and that under 
those decisions the ‘employees would receive windfall payments, 
including liquidated damages, of sums for activities performed by them 
without any expectation of reward beyond that included in their agreed 
rates of pay.’”322  The taxpayers petitioned the Supreme Court for 
certiorari, which was denied.323  
4. Graham & Foster v. Goodcell  
The Second Circuit’s decision in Battaglia relied in part on the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Graham & Foster v. Goodcell.324  In 
Goodcell, a validly-due federal tax was mistakenly collected by 
Treasury Department agents for tax periods after the taxpayers’ statute 
of limitations had run.325  In a series of cases, the taxpayers sought 
refunds and, while those claims were in litigation, Congress passed a 
retroactive tax statute that effectively denied the taxpayers’ claims.326  
 
Separation of Powers, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2107, 2130-2133 (2009).   
 320. See Gordon G. Young, United States v. Klein, Then and Now, 44 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 265, 288 
(2012) (noting that the decisions would have resulted “in liabilities, both to private employers and to the 
government, by virtue of cost-plus contracts, which were a significant percentage of the nation’s gross 
domestic product”); Vladeck, supra note 319, at 2130-2131 (noting that the cases “produced a colossal 
private and public liability for retroactive pay of over $6.5 billion” and that the “United States would 
have been liable for $1.5 billion of that under cost-plus contracts.”); Christie, supra note 319, at 755 n. 
30 (noting that the “cases construed the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 in a manner so as to impose 
huge potential liabilities upon employers. Between July 1, 1946 and January 1, 1947, almost six billion 
dollars worth of claims were filed.”). 
 321. The law was the Portal-to-Portal Act, which was based upon a finding that judicial 
interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 had disregarded “long-established customs, 
practices, and contracts between employers and employees, thereby creating wholly unexpected 
liabilities.”  Battaglia, 169 F.2d at 259 n.11.  See Christie, supra note 319, at 755 n.30 (noting that the 
legislation retroactively overruled the three prior Supreme Court cases). 
 322. See Battaglia, 169 F.2d at 258-259. See also Ricciardi & Sinclair, supra note 263, at 345 
(citing Battaglia as a “good example” of retroactive, curative legislation — where “no settled rights 
were disturbed nor expectations defeated”); Christie, supra note 319, at 755 n. 30 (1986) (citing 
Battaglia for the proposition that “a legislature may ‘overrule’ judicial decisions”).  
 323. Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948). 
 324. See 169 F.2d at 257 (citing Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409 (1931)). 
 325. 282 U.S. at 414-418. 
 326. Id. 
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The retroactive reach of the statute dated back to payments made four 
years earlier.327   
The taxpayer cases eventually made their way to the Supreme Court, 
which conceded that the taxes had been collected by the Treasury in 
error.328  The Court noted that “[l]arge amounts had been paid into the 
Treasury in this way, and it was the purpose of the Congress that 
payments made in the circumstances described … should not be 
refunded.”329  Goodcell held that the statute was constitutional despite 
the law’s retroactive operation.330  The Court concluded that the facts 
were a “case of a curative statute aptly designed to remedy mistakes and 
defects in the administration of government."331  It stated that in such 
cases the “legislature is not prevented from curing the defect in 
administration simply because the effect may be to destroy causes of 
action which would otherwise exist.”332 
E. Summary of Carlton and Dot Foods  
Carlton reaffirmed that retroactive tax statutes are entitled to 
significant judicial deference.333  Carlton dispensed with any focus on 
whether an aggrieved taxpayer challenging a retroactive tax statute 
reasonably relied upon the pre-existing law.334  The case clarified that, 
in determining whether a retroactive tax statute satisfies due process, the 
statute merely needs to be supported by a legitimate legislative purpose 
and be enacted through a rational means.335   
The application of the Carlton test is one that depends upon the 
specific circumstances of the legislation.336  With respect to the rational 
means test, the inquiry considers a statute’s actual retroactive effect.337  
In Carlton, the statute’s formal length of retroactivity and actual 
retroactive effect were identical — the statute extended back 14 months 
and nullified the benefit of taxpayer reliance costs dating back to such 
time.338  But as cases like Dot Foods reveal, that will not always be so.  
 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. at 426. 
 329. Id. at 417-18. 
 330. Id. at 429-430. 
 331. Id. at 429.    
 332. Id.  The Court also stated that this “power is necessary, that government may not be defeated 
by omissions or inaccuracies in the exercise of functions necessary to its administration.” Id. at 429-30. 
 333. See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 29-35. 
 334. See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 33-35; supra notes 115-131 and accompanying text. 
 335. 512 U.S. at 30-31. 
 336. See supra notes 79-80 and 108-110 and accompanying text. 
 337. See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 33-34; supra note 104-106 and accompanying text. 
 338. The tax deduction at issue in Carlton was enacted in October, 2006 and retroactively 
amended in December, 2007; Mr. Carlton incurred costs seeking to obtain that deduction in December 
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Carlton was decided against a backdrop of cases involving retroactive 
statutes that recognized certain statutes — unlike in Carlton — are 
curative, ratifying statutes where the formal length of the statute is long 
but the actual retroactive effect is minimal.339  Such statutes are entitled 
to greater judicial deference because they generally upset no settled 
expectations and merely reinstate the legal status quo.340  Dot Foods 
evaluated such a statute.341 
The statute in Carlton concededly upset reliance interests, but 
otherwise had minimal actual retroactive effect — in part because the 
statute affected only a “modest period of retroactivity.”342 In contrast, 
the statute in Dot Foods upset no reliance interests or settled 
expectations as it was a curative, ratifying statute.  Therefore, although 
the formal period of the statute’s retroactivity in Dot Foods was lengthy 
— significantly longer than in Carlton — the actual retroactive effect of 
the statute in Dot Foods was minimal.343  Consequently, both statutes 
were consistent with due process as evaluated under the deferential 
Carlton test. 
IV. OTHER RECENT STATE CASES 
The preceding sections of this article focused on a comparison 
between Carlton and Dot Foods. Those sections demonstrated that, 
contrary to critics’ claims, Dot Foods aligns with Carlton and reveals 
the continuing merits of the Supreme Court’s test.  This section 
evaluates several of the other recent high-profile state tax cases where 
the states have enacted retroactive tax statutes, focusing in particular on 
situations comparable to Dot Foods, i.e., where the statute reversed the 
analysis in a court decision.  However, before proceeding to the other 
state cases this section briefly evaluates two of the general critiques 
asserted against the states’ recent use of retroactive tax statutes — that 
the decided cases have rendered inconsistent results and that these cases 
reveal that the states have grown overly-dependent on retroactive 
statutes as a means of addressing budgetary concerns.   
A. Inconsistent Results 
Some have argued that the recent state cases that considered 
 
of 2006, but other estates may have acted sooner. See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 28-29.  See also supra notes 
101-106 and 108-110 and accompanying text.   
 339. See supra notes 279-332 and accompanying text. 
 340. See supra notes 258-266 and accompanying text. 
 341. See supra notes 267-273 and accompanying text. 
 342. 512 U.S. at 34-37. See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text. 
 343. See supra notes 202-212 and accompanying text. 
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retroactive tax statutes suggest a need to revisit Carlton in part because 
of the divergent results in these cases.  In its petition for certiorari to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, Dot Foods specifically cited as problematic the 
divergent lengths of the states’ statutes, which, upon being challenged, 
were typically upheld, but sometimes struck down344 — arguably, with 
no clear suggestion as to when it is that a statute will prove to have 
impermissible retroactive effect.345  The different results are, however, 
the necessary consequence of the factual variety of the cases, which will 
exist irrespective of the applicable inquiry.  Carlton correctly recognized 
that there would be variations in the nature of the legislation and so 
created a facts and circumstances test.346  Such a test virtually ensures 
that there will be results that may seem inconsistent on a superficial 
level, but that consequence alone is not reason to question the legitimacy 
of the Carlton approach.    
There is also an irony in the fact that taxpayers have critiqued Carlton 
because the state cases have resulted in decisions that have effectively 
“gone both ways.”  The Carlton test is a rational basis test, which in 
theory should favor the government in almost every instance.347  Since 
1928, the Supreme Court has not struck down a retroactive tax statute, 
and, in his Carlton concurrence, Justice Scalia approvingly observed 
that “[t]he reasoning the Court applies to uphold the statute in this case 
guarantees that all retroactive tax laws will henceforth be valid.”348 The 
 
 344. COST claims that since Carlton states have prevailed in challenges to retroactive tax statutes 
about 15% of the time. See Stephanie Cumings, Experts Disagree on Whether Retroactive Tax 
Legislation is Too Pervasive, 82 STATE TAX NOTES 886 (Dec. 19, 2016) (COST representative states 
that taxpayers lose in about 85% of the state cases — and claims that this by itself reveals that the state 
courts’ application of the Carlton test has been “fundamentally unfair”). 
 345. See, e.g., Petition For a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 252, at 9 (stating as problematic that 
that the “courts are sharply split over the [due process] limits on retroactive tax legislation”).  See also 
Brief Amicus Curiae of Council on State Taxation in Support of Petitioner, supra note 5 at 5-7 (stating 
the Supreme Court “needs to resolve the conflict among state and federal courts over the due process 
clause limitations of retroactive tax laws”); Brief for the Tax Exec. Inst., Inc. as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner, supra note 9 at 4  (“This Court should grant the taxpayer’s petition for a writ of 
certiorari to resolve the significant differences among state courts applying Carlton.”).   
 346. See supra notes 79-80 and 108-110 and accompanying text.  See also Miller v. Johnson 
Controls, 296 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Ky. 2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 935 (2010) (remarking that the 
Carlton test is one that evaluates the particular facts and circumstances); River Garden Retirement 
Home v. Franchise Tax Bd., 186 Cal. App. 4th 922, 948-949 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2010) (similar). 
 347. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 348. See, e.g., id. at 40 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).  See also Puckett, supra 
note 131, at 374 (“retroactivity generally has not been suspect under the Constitution” … even 
“generally beyond tax, the Supreme Court’s review of retroactivity has been extremely deferential”); 
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 547 and 550 (1998) (Kennedy, J. concurring) (“due process 
requires an inquiry into whether in enacting the retroactive law the legislature acted in an arbitrary and 
irrational way”; “[s]tatutes may be invalidated on due process grounds only under the most egregious of 
circumstances”).  See supra note 224 and accompanying text (citing articles noting that the Supreme 
Court has consistently upheld retroactive tax statutes).  See also supra note 64 (noting that prior to three 
outlier cases in the 1920’s the Supreme Court had never struck down a retroactive tax statute). 
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irony is that, because taxpayers have fared better in the state tax cases 
than one might expect, the critics of these cases have suggested that the 
Carlton test should be reconsidered for having rendered inconsistent 
results.349   
B. Frequent Use of Retroactive Tax Statutes as a Budgetary Tool 
Another argument of those criticizing the states’ recent retroactive tax 
statutes is that the states have too frequently relied upon these statutes as 
a tool to satisfy budgetary concerns.350  Certainly, many of the states’ 
recent retroactive tax statutes have in fact been justified, at least in part, 
as intended to protect the state fisc.351   However, Carlton was also 
justified on this basis, and Carlton was clear that the protection of the 
public fisc would generally suffice as a legitimate legislative purpose.352  
Moreover, budgetary concerns are of particular concern in the state tax 
context since, unlike the federal Government, every state except 
Vermont faces an annual balanced budget requirement.353  In other 
 
 349. See Gunning, supra note 64, at 314 (suggesting state courts are construing retroactive tax 
statutes more rigorously than Carlton requires). Susan C. Morse, Article: A Corporate Offshore Profits 
Transition Tax, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 549, 563 n.66 (2013) (citing cases where state courts have struck down 
retroactive tax statues).  In some cases, the more rigorous state review is due to the fact that the state has 
adopted an analytic standard that is more exacting than Carlton.  See, e.g., James Square Associates LP 
v. Mullen, 993 N.E.2d 374, 382-383 (NY 2013) (striking down a retroactive tax statute under New 
York’s three-part “balancing of the equities” of the test); City of Modesto v. Nat’l Med., Inc., 128 Cal. 
App. 4th 518, 529 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (“Generally in California, courts have upheld the retroactive 
application of tax laws only where such retroactivity was limited to the current tax year.”) (citing 
Gutknecht v. City of Sausalito, 43 Cal. App. 3d 269, 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)). But see River Garden 
Retirement Home v. Franchise Tax Bd., 186 Cal. App. 4th 922, 948-949 (Ct. App. 2010) (concluding 
that under the circumstances that a four year retroactive period was modest and stating “[w]e agree with 
Modesto that Carlton does call for a modest period of retroactivity, but we do not subscribe to the view 
that a period longer than one year in and of itself raises serious constitutional questions. Rather, we 
believe that the modesty of the period must be assessed under the facts and circumstances of the case.”). 
The New York case, James Square Associates, is discussed in more detail supra note 424.  See also 
Rivers v. State, 490 S.E.2d 261, 265 (S.C. 1997) (finding retroactive increase in capital gains rate 
“violates due process under both the state and federal constitutions”) (emphasis added); Zaber, 789 
N.W.2d at 654 (upholding a retroactive tax statute but noting that “[i]t is, of course, possible under the 
Iowa due process clause to adopt a different approach from the federal model.”). 
 350. See Brief of the Am. Coll. of Tax Counsel as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 9, at 3 (“The Washington Supreme Court in this case, by holding that revenue raising itself was a 
‘legitimate legislative purpose,’ misapplied [the Carlton test] and established a principle that, taken to 
its logical conclusion, would justify virtually any retroactive tax increase.”); Brief Amicus Curiae of 
Council on State Taxation in Support of Petitioner, supra note 5, at 1 (“Far too frequently, courts have 
held that preventing any significant revenue loss can satisfy the ‘legitimate legislative purpose’ test in 
Carlton.”). 
 351. See infra notes 185-188, 387-389, 419-422 and 430-436 and accompanying text. 
 352. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 31-32.  See also id. at 40 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Revenue raising is 
certainly a legitimate purpose”); id. at 37 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“retroactive application of revenue 
measures is rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of raising revenue”).    
 353. See Roin, supra note 182, at 573 (“A balanced budget ‘is widely considered to be the 
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instances, the Supreme Court’s constitutional precedent has been 
particularly sensitive to the states’ budgetary predicament.354  
The criticism that the states have used retroactive tax statutes too 
frequently in recent years as a budgetary tool is, of course, difficult to 
evaluate because it begs the subjective question as to how many 
legislative enactments is too many.  Those who have denounced the 
states’ on this basis have used as a proxy the number of recently-
reported cases in which such statutes have been contested.355  But, even 
if one accepts a focus on the number of decided cases as a fair metric, 
whether the volume of such cases has recently been high — as measured 
in the abstract — is at least questionable.356  It would seem that if one is 
to apply the taxpayer’s suggested metric, the determination as to 
whether the recent volume of cases has been excessive would logically 
require, at the very least, a comparison to the volume of similar cases 
from prior periods.  As those who have critiqued the recent state cases 
have laid the blame on Carlton, it is logical to use the period from 
immediately before Carlton as a comparative standard.  That 
comparison suggests that there has not been any significantly greater use 
of state retroactivity statutes in recent years.357    
C. Case Analysis 
The following discussion reviews other high-profile recent cases that 
evaluate a situation in which a state enacted a retroactive tax statute to 
reverse the impact of a judicial decision, as in Dot Foods.  These cases 
 
foundation of state fiscal practices.’”) (quotes and citation omitted). Professor Roin argues that 
retroactive tax statutes can and should be utilized in a more general way to assist the states with their 
balanced budget requirements.  See id. at 571-574, 603-604. 
 354. See, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 31 
(1990) (where a state’s statute violates a taxpayer’s constitutional rights for prior periods, the state is 
only required to provide, not necessarily dollar refunds, but “meaningful backward-looking relief”); 
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (under the 11th Amendment the states cannot be 
sued in federal court without their consent); Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673 (2012) 
(providing the states with flexibility in methods of governmental financing largely unimpeded by the 
equal protection clause); Dep’t of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008) (traditional 
government state functions such as the issuance of debt securities are immune from dormant Commerce 
Clause scrutiny). 
 355. See, e.g., Stephanie Cumings, Experts Disagree on Whether Retroactive Tax Legislation is 
Too Pervasive, 82 STATE TAX NOTES 886 (Dec. 19, 2016). 
 356. See id. 
 357. A LEXIS search for the 20 year period preceding Carlton, January 1, 1974 to January 1, 
1994 reveals 43 state tax retroactivity cases; a LEXIS search for the 20 year period, January 1, 1996 to 
January 1, 2016 reveals 50 such cases.  This search employed the terms “retroactive” and “tax,” with 
appropriate search connectors, and included a search for a reference to the case Welch v. Henry, 305 
U.S. 134, in the earlier period and Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, in the latter.  A subsequent analysis verified 
which cases actually posed the issue as to the validity of a retroactive tax.  Where more than one case 
evaluated the same statute, a case was counted only once. 
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are the recent Michigan “compact cases,”358 the New York case of 
Caprio v. New York State Dep’t of Taxation & Finance,359 and the 
Kentucky case of Miller v. Johnson Controls, Inc.360 The Michigan 
“compact cases” involved lawsuits that were initiated by a large number 
of taxpayers361 and Caprio and Johnson Controls have each been 
singled out by taxpayer representatives for criticism.362 As the analysis 
of the cases makes clear, however, each of the relevant statutes was 
effectively justified as a curative, ratifying statute, similar to the statute 
in Dot Foods. 
1. The Michigan Compact Cases 
When the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Dot Foods in April, 
2017, it also denied certiorari in several consolidated Michigan cases.363  
These Michigan cases were one permutation of a coordinated attempt by 
a large group of taxpayers to obtain state corporate income tax refunds 
in multiple states.364  In particular, the effort was directed at states that 
had become parties to the Multistate Tax Compact (“Compact”) several 
decades earlier.365  These states adopted the provisions of the Compact 
into their laws, including the provisions of the Uniform Division of 
Income for Tax Purposes Act (“UDITPA”).366  As adopted by these 
“Compact States,” UDITPA provided that a multistate taxpayer filing 
 
 358. See supra note 1 and accompany text. 
 359. 37 N.E.3d 707 (NY), rehearing denied, 38 N.E.3d 817 (2015).   
 360. 296 S.W.3d 392 (Ky. 2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 935 (2010). 
 361. Amy Hamilton, Michigan Supreme Court Is Asked to Review Decisions on Retroactive Tax 
Laws, 78 STATE TAX NOTES 697 (Dec. 7, 2015) (noting that there were 50 docketed Michigan cases that 
were eventually consolidated). 
 362. See, e.g., Timothy Noonan, et. al, The Emperor Strikes Back in Caprio, 77 STATE TAX 
NOTES 533 (Aug. 10, 2015) (critiquing Caprio); Erica L. Horn & Stephen A. Sherman, Retroactive Tax 
Legislation: Where Is the Modesty? Bloomberg BNA Weekly State Tax Report 11/23/2012 (critiquing 
Johnson Controls). 
 363. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.  
 364. See Amy Hamilton, Deadlines Approaching in Several Multistate Tax Compact Cases, 79 
STATE TAX NOTES 827 (March 16, 2016); Amy Hamilton, Multistate Tax Compact Refund Claims 
Pending in 4 New States, 81 STATE TAX NOTES 920 (Sept. 19, 2016).   
 365. The strategy was set in motion by one of the big 4 accounting firms  See Best of 2012, STATE 
TAX TODAY: TAX ANALYSTS (Nov. 12, 2012) (discussing the genesis of the strategy and the initial 
case); Billy Hamilton, What Did the MTC Think and When Did They Think It?, 66 STATE TAX NOTES 
751 (Dec. 3, 2012) (noting that persons at the accounting firm “assisted in filing the claims at issue in 
the [initial refund] case before the California court, helped develop the litigation issues, and worked 
with counsel on the case”) (brackets added).   
 366. See John Swain, Reforming the State Corporate Income Tax: A Market State Approach to the 
Sourcing of Service Receipts, 83 Tul. L. Rev. 285, 295 (2008); The Multistate Tax Compact Suggested 
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corporate income tax returns was entitled to elect to use a three-factor 
apportionment formula consisting of the factors of property, payroll and 
sales.367 
Beginning in the mid-1990’s, the states — including the Compact 
States — started to move away from three-factor apportionment in favor 
of a single sales factor.368  In some states, this action raised a potential 
question concerning the state’s power to impose a mandatory 
apportionment formula without withdrawing from the Compact.  For 
years, the issue lay dormant.  Then beginning with California in 2010, 
taxpayers that would benefit from the use of a three-factor formula 
started to file amended returns applying that methodology and claiming 
refunds.369  Similar refunds were subsequently claimed in Texas, 
Oregon, Minnesota, and Michigan.370 
In Michigan, there was a unique wrinkle.  Michigan adopted its first 
corporate income tax in 1967 and then adopted the Compact in 1970; 
however, in 1976, Michigan eliminated its corporate income tax in favor 
of a single business tax, which taxed activity and not income.371  In 
2008, Michigan repealed the single business tax and re-enacted a 
corporate income tax, which included a single sales factor 
apportionment formula.372  During the period between 1976 and 2008, 
Michigan’s membership in the Compact remained in place.373  However, 
state legislators believed that they impliedly repealed the Compact’s 
three-factor election when they enacted the 2008 legislation.374  In 2009, 
IBM filed a return for tax year 2008 that sought to use the Compact’s 
three-factor formula and the state rejected its filing.375  IBM 
subsequently brought suit challenging this denial.376  In 2011, Michigan 
 
 367. See Swain, supra note 366, at 292-295. 
 368. Brief of the Multistate Tax Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant and 
Respondent, at 5-8, Gillette Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 207 Cal. App. 4th 1369 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (No. 
A130803), 2011 WL 6260592, at *5-8. 
 369. See The Gillette Co. v. Franchise Tax Board, 209 Cal. App. 4th 938, 949 (2012), rev’d, 363 
P.3d 94 (2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 294 (2016) (noting the company filed six claims for refund in 
January of 2010). 
 370. Each of the cases were litigated and ultimately resulted in a final decision for the state.  The 
cases in Michigan are discussed infra notes 371-402 and accompanying text.  See also Health Net Inc. v. 
Dep't of Revenue, 362 Or. 700 (Or. 2018); Graphic Packaging Corp. v. Hegar, 2017 Tex. LEXIS 1184 
(Tex. 2017); Kimberly Clark v. Comm’r, 880 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 2016); The Gillette Co. v. Franchise 
Tax Bd., 363 P.3d 94 (Ca. 2015). 
 371. IBM v. Dep’t of Treasury, 852 N.W.2d 865, 869-70 (Mich. 2014); Gillette Commer. 
Operations N. Am. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 878 N.W.2d 891, 899 (Mich. 2015), rev. denied, 880 N.W.2d 
230 (2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017). 
 372. 852 N.W.2d at 870, 873. 
 373. Id. at 871. 
 374. Gillette, 878 N.W.2d at 900-901.  See IBM, 852 N.W.2d at 874. 
 375. IBM, 852 N.W.2d at 868. 
 376. Id. 
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repealed the Compact election effective January 1, 2011.377  The state’s 
position was that this 2011 repeal expressly confirmed the state’s 2008 
implied repeal of that election.378   
Similar to the litigation in Dot Foods, IBM’s refund claim, for tax 
year 2008, failed at two lower state courts, the state’s trial court and the 
court of appeals.379  But then — again similar to Dot Foods — the 
taxpayer succeeded in a split decision rendered by the state’s supreme 
court, a case that was decided 3–1–3.380  In contrast to the lower court 
decisions, the Michigan Supreme Court’s 2014 splintered decision 
concluded that the state’s 2008 legislation did not impliedly repeal the 
Compact election, and also that the state’s 2011 legislation expressly 
repealing the Compact election was retroactive only to the beginning of 
2011.381  Therefore, the court concluded that the state’s three-factor 
apportionment formula could be applied by the taxpayer for its tax year 
2008, and in theory could be applied by any taxpayer during the period 
January 1, 2008, to January 1, 2011.382  However, the Court also 
recognized that the 2011 legislature “could have — but did not — 
extend [the] retroactive repeal to the start date of the [2008 
legislation].”383  
As the IBM litigation proceeded, between 2011 and 2015, numerous 
multistate Michigan corporate taxpayers filed suit seeking refunds due 
pursuant to the Compact election — refunds that had been previously 
denied by the state on the ground that the only apportionment method 
available was the single sales factor method established by the 2008 
legislation.384  Most of these taxpayers filed their original returns using 
single-factor apportionment and did not seek to use the Compact’s three-
factor formula until the relevant tax years had passed.385  These cases 
were mostly filed prior to the Michigan Supreme Court’s 2014 
resolution in IBM, and were held in abeyance pending that decision.386   
In the aftermath of the IBM decision, the state determined that its 
potential liability for refunds to IBM and to the other taxpayers that had 
 
 377. Id. at 875-876.   
 378. Gillette, 878 N.W.2d at 900-901 (noting the legislature’s later statement that “the 2011 
amendatory act … was to further express the original intent of the legislature regarding the application 
of [the earlier 2008 repeal”]) (brackets added).  
 379. See IBM, 852 N.W.2d at 869. 
 380. See generally IBM, 852 N.W.2d 865.  A concurring judge, writing for himself, aligned 
himself with the majority for purposes of the holding; three of the judges dissented.  See generally id.   
 381. See generally id. at 868-876; id. at 881-882 (Zahra, J., concurring). 
 382. Gillette, 878 N.W.2d at 902. 
 383. IBM, 852 N.W.2d at 876 (brackets added). 
 384. See Gillette, 878 N.W.2d at 902. 
 385. See Brief in Opposition at 25, Sonoco Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017) 
(No. 16-687), 2017 WL 1020032. 
 386. Gillette, 878 N.W.2d at 901. 
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filed amended returns with respect to taxes previously collected was 
$1.1 billion.387  Given that Michigan has a balanced budget requirement 
and an annual budget of approximately $50 billion,388 the impact of 
these refunds would have significantly affected the state’s budgetary 
process.  Within two months, the Michigan legislature acted with little 
dissent to retroactively repeal the Compact provisions dating back to 
2008 — thus eliminating the taxpayers’ retroactive tax claims.389  The 
bill noted that, in so doing, the legislature sought to reinstate the original 
intent of both the prior 2008 and the 2011 legislatures to disable the 
Compact election.390  The legislature acted on successive days, and one 
day later, the Governor signed the bill into law.391    
The numerous Michigan corporate taxpayers that filed refund claims 
pending, or subsequent to, the outcome in IBM then challenged the 
retroactive statute as unconstitutional under Carlton, citing, among other 
things, the fact that the 2014 legislation had a retroactive length that 
extended back to 2008.392  However, the state trial court and appeals 
court upheld the law, and the state supreme court denied a request for 
further review.393  In rejecting the taxpayers’ argument that the period of 
retroactivity was too lengthy, the appeals court noted that the legislature 
only realized that its prior law had failed to retroactively repeal the 
Compact election when the state supreme court decided IBM in 2014, 
and that “the Legislature acted promptly to correct the error” at that 
time.394  The court also noted that the “6½-year retroactive period was 
sufficiently modest relative to the length of other retroactive legislation 
that have been upheld by Michigan courts, federal courts, and other state 
 
 387. Id. at 910 (quoting Senate Legislative Analysis, SB 156, September 10, 2014, p. 5).  A 
legislative analysis noted that the high cost derived from the fact that taxpayers who had not previously 
been allowed by the Michigan Department of Treasury to use the alternative 3-factor apportionment 
calculation would be permitted to do so under the Gillette decision.  See id.  That analysis also noted 
that the cost would be directly borne by the Michigan General Fund.  Id. 
 388. See 2015-2016 MICH. EXEC. BUDGET, available at 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/budget/Budget_final2_447264_7.pdf. 
 389. The vote in the House was 100-10; the vote in the Senate was 35-3. See Aryn L. McCumber, 
Billion Dollar Decision: International Business Machines v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 40 
MICH. TAX L. 6 (2014). 
 390. The law provided that the legislature’s “original intent” in both the prior 2008 and 2011 
legislative acts was to eliminate the ability for taxpayers to use the Compact’s three factor 
apportionment election provision as of 2008.  Gillette, 878 N.W.2d at 900-901.   
 391. See Solo Cup Operating Corp. v. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 327766, 2016 Mich. App. LEXIS 
2358, at *31 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2016). 
 392. See generally Gillette, 878 N.W.2d at 899.  See also Daniel L. Stanley & Brian T. Quinn, 
2016-3 NYU INSTITUTE ON STATE & LOCAL TAXATION § 3.02, Multistate Tax Compact 
Litigation (noting a group of 50 pending appeals were eventually consolidated by the Michigan court of 
appeals). 
 393. Gillette Operations N. Am. v. Dep't of Treasury, 878 N.W.2d 891, 899 (Mich. 2015)), rev. 
denied, 880 N.W.2d 230 (2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017). 
 394. Id. at 911. 
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courts.”395   
The Michigan appeals court in Gillette made reference to the judicial 
doctrine that governs curative retroactive tax statutes.396  It relied upon 
the Michigan Supreme Court’s earlier decision in General Motors Corp. 
v. Dep’t of Treasury,397 in which the court noted that “it is legitimate for 
the Legislature to amend a law that it believes the judiciary has wrongly 
interpreted.”398 Further, the Gillette court noted that, as in General 
Motors, the legislature merely “confirmed a tax that had been assessed 
and paid for many years” to prevent “a significant loss of revenue.”399  
Also, the court cited General Motors for the proposition that “the 
nominal period to which the amendment retrospectively applies cannot 
be said to extend beyond the taxpayers’ interest in finality and repose 
because the period of retroactivity is consistent with the applicable 
statute of limitations.”400   
The Michigan court’s emphasis on the taxpayers’ statutes of 
limitation is consistent with the analysis in Dot Foods, where the 
Washington Supreme Court similarly concluded that the retroactive 
period of the statute in question, as applied to the taxpayer, Dot Foods, 
was limited by the taxpayer’s open statute of limitations.401  This 
analysis also generally comports with the conclusion of Professor Julie 
A. Roin that, in general, retroactive tax statutes that are limited to a 
taxpayer’s open statute of limitations should be permissible since “it is 
 
 395. Id. 
 396. See generally id. at 899-925. 
 397. 803 N.W.2d 698 (Mich. 2010) (per curiam), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1178 (2012). 
 398. Gillette, 878 N.W.2d at 909 (quoting General Motors, 803 N.W.2d at 710). 
 399. Id. (citing General Motors, 803 N.W.2d at 712).  In General Motors, the Michigan 
legislature acted to retroactively clarify a state supreme court decision that it estimated would result in 
$250.2 million in refunds.  803 N.W.2d at 706.  That decision would have afforded car dealers a sale for 
resale exemption on the purchase of automobiles even though they made interim use of the automobiles 
before reselling them.  Id. at 702-708.  The law was enacted in 2007 shortly after the decision and was 
effective “beginning September 30, 2002, and for all tax years not barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations.”  Id. at 703.  The court upheld the statute in part because it only served to “confirm the 
application of a tax previously imposed” and the taxpayer had not detrimentally relied upon the prior 
language of the use tax (as evidenced by the fact that it was filing claims for refunds, not supporting an 
original return position).  Id. at 712.  
 400. Gillette, 878 N.W.2d at 909-910 (quoting General Motors, 803 N.W.2d at 712). Gillette also 
cited General Motors for the proposition that “[a] legislature’s action to mend a leak in the public 
treasury or tax revenue — whether created by poor drafting of legislation in the first instance or by a 
judicial decision — with retroactive legislation has almost universally been recognized as ‘rationally 
related to a legitimate legislative purpose.’” See id. at 909 (quoting General Motors, 803 N.W.2d at 710, 
in turn quoting United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 35 (1994)).  
 401. See supra notes 202-207 and accompanying text. See Brief in Opposition, supra note 385, at 
16 (“Retroactivity only briefly came into the picture [as of 2011] three years after [the enactment of the 
statute in question], when a judicial misinterpretation of the law in July 2014 retroactively gave out-of-
state businesses a new right. But the Legislature clarified and corrected that misinterpretation, restoring 
the status quo that had existed since 2008.”).  For a more general comparison with Dot Foods, see 
generally supra note 212. 
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hard to argue that anyone can have ‘settled expectations’ regarding their 
tax liability until that year’s statute of limitations for tax adjustments has 
closed.”402  
2. Caprio v. New York State Dep’t of Taxation & Finance 
In Caprio v. New York State Dep’t of Taxation & Finance, 403 New 
York’s highest court upheld a retroactive tax statute that reversed the 
analysis of two lower state court cases involving two unrelated 
taxpayers.404  Those cases, decided in 2009, evaluated New York’s 
personal income tax law and the relevant federal income tax law to 
which that New York law conformed.405  In each case, the taxpayer had 
taken the position that he could sell certain in-state assets and structure 
the sale such that the sale proceeds would not be subject to state income 
tax.406   
In 2010, shortly after the two lower court cases were decided, the 
state legislature acted to retroactively address the applicable law, 
retroactive to 2007. The act was deemed “necessary to correct” the 
analysis in the two decisions, which the legislature concluded 
“erroneously overturned the longstanding policies of [the department of 
taxation and finance].”407 The court also noted a legislative intention “to 
clarify the concept of federal conformity in the personal income tax” 
and to prevent “unintended refunds.”408   
 
 402. See Roin, supra note 182, at 597-598. Gillette also, as in Dot Foods, rejected the taxpayers’ 
claim that the retroactive tax legislation violated the doctrine of separation of powers.  878 N.W.2d at 
912-913. The court noted that it was the legislature’s power to make laws, and the judiciary’s power to 
construe them.  Id.  The court also concluded that there was little doubt that the legislature lacked the 
“authority to reverse a judicial decision … but [that] there is also little doubt that it has the authority — 
if not the obligation — to amend a statute that it believes has been misconstrued by the judiciary.” Id. at 
913 (citing Romein v. Gen. Motors Corp., 462 N.W.2d 555, 566 (Mich. 1990), aff’d 503 U.S. 181 
(1992)).  As in Dot Foods, IBM, the taxpayer that prevailed in the earlier case addressed by the 
retroactive legislation, ultimately received a refund for the tax years at issue – although not without a 
fight. See IBM Corp. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 891 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 2016).  
 403. 37 N.E.3d 707 (N.Y. 2015), rehearing denied, 38 N.E.3d 817 (2015).   
 404. Those cases were In re Baum, No. 820837, 2009 WL 427425 (N.Y. Tax Trib. Feb. 12, 2009) 
and In re Mintz, No. 821807,  2009 WL 1657395 (N.Y. Div. of Tax App., June 4, 2009).  See Caprio, 
37 N.E.3d at 711. 
 405. Caprio, 37 N.E.3d at 711. 
 406. See id.  New York law taxed non-residents’ income derived from New York sources, but not 
the income from the sale of stock unless the stock (as opposed to the underlying assets) was used in an 
in-state trade or business.  Id. at 708-711. The taxpayers were nonresidents that sold stock and made an 
IRC § 338(h)(10) election to treat the sale of stock as the sale of assets for federal income tax purposes.  
Id. The taxpayers then elected installment sale treatment under federal law, which New York respects.  
See id. The taxpayers claimed that, although the assets deemed to be sold were New York assets, that 
they were not taxable on the gain because the gain actually derived from the sale of stock.  Id.   
 407. Id. at 711-715. 
 408. Id. at 711. 
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New York has its own judicial test for evaluating a retroactive tax 
statute that is more rigorous than the two-part test in Carlton.  New 
York’s “balancing of the equities” test focuses on (1) the taxpayer’s 
notice of the retroactive change and the reasonableness of its reliance on 
old law, (2) the length of the retroactive period, and (3) the public 
purpose for the retroactive application.409  The focus on taxpayer notice 
and reliance resembles the test applied by the lower court in Carlton, 
which the U.S. Supreme Court later rejected.410  The focus on the length 
of the retroactive period mimics the concern of Justice O’Connor, who 
in her concurrence in Carlton was the only Justice to emphasize this 
factor.411 Even applying New York’s more exacting standards, Caprio 
upheld the retroactive statute. 
Caprio concluded that the state’s retroactive statute passed each 
prong of New York’s three-part test.412  The court determined that the 
taxpayers’ reliance on the pre-existing law was unreasonable because it 
relied upon “an untested interpretation of prior law — unsupported by 
any actual experience, practice or professional advice.”413  It analogized 
the case to an earlier New York case that decided when “a long-standing 
policy has been changed by a nonbinding ruling, and then the old policy 
is codified by [a] statute,” the retroactive tax legislation did not violate 
due process.414  The court also stated that when a statute is ambiguous a 
subsequent legislative construction of that statute is entitled to great 
weight.415  The court’s conclusions resemble the conclusions in Dot 
Foods: the legislature possesses discretion to fix an ambiguous statute, 
and is also entitled to correct a judicial interpretation to reflect the law 
as it was generally understood prior to that interpretation.416   
As required by the state standard, Caprio also considered the 
retroactive length of the statute at issue. The court determined that the 
retroactive length of the statute was three and a half years (the period of 
an affected taxpayer’s open statute of limitations), which it concluded 
was not unreasonable under the circumstances.417  In so doing, the court 
noted a prior New York case that affirmed a retroactive tax statute that 
extended back six years.418  The court considered the statute at issue to 
be “curative” because it was intended to correct the two prior erroneous 
 
 409. Id. at 708, 713. 
 410. See supra notes 66-67 and 115-124 and accompanying text. 
 411. See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text. 
 412. Caprio, 37 N.E.3d at 713-717. 
 413. Id. at 714. 
 414. Id. (citing Varrington Corp. v. City of N.Y. Dept. of Fin., 647 N.E.2d 746, 748 (N.Y. 1995)). 
 415. Id. at 714-715. 
 416. See generally supra notes 144-212. 
 417. Caprio, 37 N.E.3d at 711-12, 716-17. 
 418. Id. at 716-17. 
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court cases and to prevent the payment of “unintended refunds,” which 
the state estimated would be “many millions of dollars  . . . without 
legislative intervention.”419  This second test was therefore met, 
“[i]nasmuch as [the] purposes [of the statute] were curative and the 
period of retroactivity was rationally related thereto — the amendments 
applied retroactively to only those tax years that remained open.”420  As 
was true of its conclusions more generally, the court’s determination 
that the legislature could retroactively address the taxpayers’ open tax 
years was also similar to the analysis in Dot Foods.421 
Finally, the court concluded that the statute had the requisite public 
purpose — “attempting to correct an error or preventing significant and 
unanticipated revenue loss.”422  The court noted that the “curative, 
rational public purposes set forth in the legislative findings” met this 
standard as they were “compelling.”423  In its conclusion, the court 
stated that “given the legislature’s curative purposes, the extension of 
the retroactive application of the statute to only those tax years for 
which a taxpayer could seek a refund and the lack of justifiable reliance 
by plaintiffs on prior law, the retroactivity period here is not excessive, 
arbitrary or irrational.”424 
3. Miller v. Johnson Controls, Inc. 
In the 2009 Kentucky case, Miller v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,425 the 
retroactive tax statute pertained to the state’s policy allowing affiliated 
corporate income taxpayers to file tax returns on a combined basis.426  
 
 419. Id. at 717. 
 420. Id. 
 421. See supra notes 202-207 and accompanying text. 
 422. Caprio, 37 N.E.3d at 717 (internal quotations omitted). 
 423. Id.  
 424. Id.  In contrast, in James Square Assocs. LP v. Mullen, the same court struck down New 
York’s attempt to make retroactive changes to a tax credit program that was intended to stimulate 
economic development in less affluent areas.  993 N.E.2d 374, 382-83 (N.Y. 2013). The changes were 
intended to rein in abuses such as where a company transfers employees among related entities to appear 
to have created new jobs in a certain location. Id. at 377-378. The amendments were made retroactive 
and were to be used to de-certify persons that had previously qualified for the credit.  Id. A number of 
taxpayers were subsequently de-certified and a series of cases ensued, in which the taxpayers each 
generally prevailed in the lower court case before reaching the state’s high court on a consolidated basis.  
Id. at 378-380. In striking down the legislation, the court noted that it was not a curative measure 
intended to fix a legislative error and was a statute that upset taxpayers’ justifiable reliance interests.  Id. 
at 383-384.  Also, the court concluded that the length of retroactivity — either 16 months or 32 months, 
as argued by the parties — was excessive in either event because it “was long enough … so that 
plaintiffs gained a reasonable expectation that they would ‘secure repose’ in the existing tax scheme.”  
Id. at 382. 
 425. 296 S.W.3d 392 (Ky. 2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 935 (2010). 
 426. Id. at 393. 
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While Kentucky had allowed this practice for a period of years, it 
responded to several state cases and adopted a policy in 1988, which 
limited this method of filing to circumstances where the state imposed it 
on a company for remedial purposes.427  A taxpayer, GTE Corp 
(“GTE”), which had filed on a combined basis for the tax years 1984-
1987, but was now prevented from doing so, challenged the state’s new 
policy.428  GTE prevailed at the trial court, suffered a reversal at the 
state appeals court, and then succeeded at the state supreme court in 
1994.429    
In response to the 1994 GTE decision, GTE and other similarly-
situated taxpayers who would benefit from the decision filed refund 
claims seeking to amend their tax filings on a retroactive basis.430  The 
Kentucky legislature meets biannually.431  In 1996, the legislature 
prospectively prohibited the combined filings.432  Then, in the period 
1996 to 1998, the legislature realized that the decision in GTE created 
the prospect for the payment of substantial refunds for prior tax years.433 
However, the legislature was not able to address the problem until late 
in the 1998 legislative session, and in that session was only able to act to 
suspend, rather than bar, all refund claims that were based upon GTE.434  
This action was a “patch” that was to last two years, on the theory that 
the problem would be addressed by the legislature in its 2000 session.435 
Finally, in 2000, the legislature retroactively prohibited all prior year 
refund claims that were based on a change in reporting as permitted by 
the GTE decision.436     
 
 427. Id.  
 428. Id. at 394. See GTE v. Revenue Cabinet, 889 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Ky. 1994). 
 429. See GTE, 889 S.W.2d at 788, 792-793. 
 430. Johnson Controls, 296 S.W.3d at 404 (Schroder, J, concurring).  As explained by the court: 
The Appellees originally filed separate tax returns. In 1994, this Court decided GTE v. 
Revenue Cabinet, Commonwealth of Kentucky, 889 S.W.2d 788 (Ky.1994), which held that 
related corporations (such as a parent and subsidiary) could file a combined tax return under 
the unitary business concept. After GTE was decided, the Appellees in this case sought to 
amend their returns by substituting combined returns under the unitary business concept as 
allowed in GTE, because they would owe less tax under such an approach and could 
therefore claim a refund of taxes they claim to have overpaid. 
Id. at 394 (majority opinion). 
 431. See id. at 395. 
 432. Id. The legislation also had limited actual retroactive effect, as it prohibited such filings for 
tax years ending on or after December 31, 1995. Id.   
 433. Id. The refunds would have resulted in a cost of “up to $190 million,” which would have 
required that the legislature “cut the budget $190 million.”  See id at 405 n.2 (Schroder, J., concurring) 
(quoting the legislative history). 
 434. Id. at 395 (majority opinion). 
 435. Id. 
 436. Id. at 395-396. 
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A group of taxpayers contested the retroactive legislation.437  Because 
taxpayers sought to file amended returns for open tax periods at the time 
of GTE (i.e., 1994), and the legislature was not able to address the 
refund issue until 2000, the length of the potential retroactivity as to 
some taxpayers was potentially nine years or more.438  The state court of 
appeals ruled for the taxpayers on the theory that the length of 
retroactivity was too long to be valid under Carlton.439 On appeal, the 
Kentucky Supreme Court reversed and affirmed the retroactive 
statute.440  The supreme court noted that, contrary to the appeals court’s 
analysis, Carlton did not set forth a firm standard that limited a statute’s 
retroactive length.441  The state supreme court relied in part on the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeal’s post-Carlton decision in Montana Rail Link, 
Inc. v. United States,442 which upheld “a seven year retroactivity 
period.”443   
The supreme court also concluded that the statute’s retroactive length 
was not disqualifying because: (1) the appellees were on notice of the 
state’s position from 1988 and could not have had any “settled 
expectations” to the contrary; (2) the legislature acted to supersede GTE 
immediately after the decision but did not quickly address prior year 
refund claims only because it was too soon to know whether there would 
be such claims;444 and (3) the legislature met only bi-annually and still 
had not defined the refund problem in 1998.445   
The length of the retroactive period was also justified, in the court’s 
view, because “the legislature had no means of knowing who would 
 
 437. Id. at 393-394. 
 438. See Johnson Controls, 296 S.W.3d at 416, 418 (Abramson, J., dissenting) (noting a potential 
retroactivity period of “from five-and-a-half years to twelve years”). 
 439. See id. at 400, 406 (Schroder, J., concurring). 
 440. Id. at 400 (majority opinion). The decision was 4-2. See generally Miller v. Johnson 
Controls, Inc., 296 S.W.3d 392 (Ky. 2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 935 (2010). 
 441. Id.  at 400.   
 442. 76 F.2d 991 (9th Cir.1996). 
 443. Johnson Controls, 296 S.W.3d at 399-400 (discussing Montana Rail Link, 76 F.3d 991).  See 
also the discussion of Montana Rail Link, supra note 301 and accompanying text. 
 444. This was “because the legislature had no means of knowing who would wish to combine 
their separate returns in order to request a refund, or even if a refund would be required after they did.” 
Johnson Controls, 296 S.W.3d at 400-401. 
 445. Id. at 400-401.  The court also stated: 
While it might be tempting to require the legislature to be omniscient so as to immediately 
understand the ramifications of case law on statutory application, history tells us that often 
the development of law based on the holdings in cases takes time to go through process 
before the clear impact can be seen. Combine this with delays caused by a biennial 
legislative schedule, and it is rational that the legislature acted with reasonable diligence in 
this complicated matter. 
Id. at 401.  In contrast, the dissent concluded that the retroactive statute violated due process because the 
retroactive reach of the statute was impermissible.  Id. at 416-419 (Abramson, J., dissenting). 
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wish to combine their separate returns” in the years immediately 
following the GTE decision, and the legislature acted as soon as the 
scope of the “unanticipated revenue loss” became known.446  The court 
also noted that “[w]hile due process is certainly a constitutionally 
protected right, it is not impacted under the facts of this case, given the 
clear and lengthy notice, the lack of settled expectations and lack of 
detrimental reliance.”447 Finally, it stated that “[a]ll the legislature did 
was clarify the statute after this Court interpreted it in GTE.”448 
V. CONCLUSION 
The 1994 Supreme Court case, United States v. Carlton, states a 
rational-basis, two-part test that evaluates the due process fairness of a 
retroactive tax statute.449  This test is deferential to such statutes because 
Carlton concurred with the Court’s longstanding precedent, concluding 
that determinations with respect to a government’s tax and fiscal policy-
making are rightfully and ultimately the province of the legislative 
process.450   
The Carlton case reached the Supreme Court because the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals was sympathetic to a taxpayer who had relied 
upon the clear language of a statute, which Congress then changed.451  
Carlton specifically held that the judiciary is not to second-guess a 
legislature’s retroactive tax determinations even when the reliance 
interests of individual taxpayers are upset, i.e., so long as the Court’s 
due process standards are otherwise met.452   
Much of the subsequent criticism of Carlton has been directed at the 
arguable unfairness that can result if a legislature is not bound to respect 
 
 446. Id. at 400-401 (majority opinion).   
 447. Id. at 401. 
 448. Id. at 401. A similar decision was rendered by the same court in King v. Campbell County. 
217 S.W.3d 862 (Ky. 2006).  In that case, as in Johnson Controls, the state legislature retroactively 
reversed a state supreme court decision that invalidated county taxes.  See generally King, 217 S.W.3d 
862. In affirming the retroactive statute, the court noted that “the taxpayers’ expectations arose only 
with [the court’s prior decision] and that within a few short months, . . . long before those expectations 
could be deemed ‘settled’ or ‘vested,’ the General Assembly had acted to revise the law and to shield 
[the counties] from what it believed could be the devastating consequences of the [court’s] decision.” Id. 
at 870.  It stated that “[i]n these circumstances — where the General Assembly has not attempted to 
withdraw legislation upon which taxpayers have relied in structuring their affairs, but has promptly 
sought to foreclose refunds as the result of an unanticipated judicial interpretation of a constitutionally 
valid tax provision — the retroactive provisions of [the Act] do not run afoul of the timeliness concerns 
expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Carlton.” Id.  
 449. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 30-31. 
 450. Id. 
 451. Id. at 29-30, 33-35. 
 452. Id. at 33-35. 
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taxpayer reliance interests when imposing a retroactive tax.453  But 
Carlton concluded that when a statute is retroactively amended to 
prevent a significant revenue loss, the question of fairness is complex — 
and appropriate for legislative consideration — since, if the loss is not 
addressed through a retroactive statutory fix, the cost will ultimately be 
borne by an “innocent” general public.454  Also, Carlton reflects the 
view that the political process will generally prevent the government 
from improperly imposing unfair retroactive taxes.455   
The Carlton two-part test is not only deferential, it is flexible, as it 
must be in order to grapple with a wide range of potential fact 
patterns.456  The recent state tax cases, including Dot Foods, where state 
legislatures have retroactively amended tax statutes to reverse the 
impact of a recently-decided court decision, reflect one set of such fact 
patterns.  Although some have claimed that Carlton does not properly 
address these state cases, review of the cases, including Dot Foods, 
suggests otherwise.   
Under Carlton, a statute must be supported by a legitimate legislative 
purpose, and the protection of the public fisc will suffice as such 
purpose.457  This is logical because a primary premise of Carlton was to 
respect the legislature’s difficult determination of how, and to whom, to 
distribute the costs of government.458  The recent state tax cases are 
consistent with this concern as many of the cases, including Dot Foods, 
have resulted because of a legislative response to a court decision that 
had the prospect of being extremely costly.459   
Carlton also requires that retroactive tax legislation must be effected 
by a rational means.460  The length of a statute’s retroactivity is relevant 
to this determination, but the inquiry’s specific focus is on the statute’s 
“actual retroactive effect.”461  Consistent with this notion, Dot Foods 
and the other recent state tax cases discussed in this article make clear 
that a retroactive tax statute can technically have a lengthy retroactive 
term, but minimal actual retroactive effect.462  In these state cases the 
statutes were not imposing retroactive tax or denying a previously 
 
 453. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 454. See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 32.  See also supra notes 117-121 and accompanying text. 
 455. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 456. See supra notes 79-80 and 108-110 and accompanying text. 
 457. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 31-32. See supra note 352 and accompanying text. 
 458. See supra notes 71-75 and 117-121 and accompanying text. 
 459. See supra notes 179-181, 387, 419 and 433 and accompanying text.   The cases could have 
been costly because the decisions themselves had retroactive impact and would have allowed for 
refunds.  See id.  
 460. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 30-31. 
 461. Id. at 33-34.  See supra notes 105-106 and 336-343 and accompanying text. 
 462. See supra notes 202-207, 239-249, 392-402, 417-421, and 437-448 and accompanying text. 
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authorized tax benefit — as in the case of a law that retroactively 
impacts completed taxpayer transactions — but rather foreclosing 
refunds for prior years suddenly due under a questionable court 
decision.463  Given the prior general understanding of state law, the 
affected taxpayers had no “settled expectations” that they would be 
entitled to these refunds until the time of the court opinion, and in each 
case, the state acted quickly after that decision to legislatively re-impose 
the legal “status quo.”464  Because these statutes had minimal practical 
retroactive impact, they were generally consistent both with Carlton and 
the Supreme Court’s longstanding judicial doctrine that applies to 
curative, ratifying legislation.465  
Some have also claimed that, because the recent state tax statutes 
pertained to the reversal of the impact of a judicial decision, this should 
somehow have insulated those statutes from review under the deferential 
Carlton test.466  However, if one accepts Carlton’s premise that the 
legislative process is generally the ultimate arbiter of proper retroactive 
taxation there is no reason to distinguish the circumstance where this 
taxation is effected through the response to a costly court case.  Just as 
in the case of retroactive legislation more generally, it is fair for a 
legislature to determine whether the citizens of the state should bear the 
costs of a court decision, or whether the decision should be legislatively 
restricted. Such determinations are even more critical in the state tax 
context than they are nationally because state governments are required 
to balance their books annually.467  Furthermore, where the financial 
implications of a court decision are significant — as has been generally 
true in the recent state cases — there is even greater reason to think that 
the political process will operate to prevent the retroactive legislation if 
 
 463. Consequently, the recent state tax cases do not implicate Carlton’s analysis with respect to 
reliance — the aspect of Carlton that afterwards was the most frequently criticized.  See supra note 128 
and accompanying text. 
 464. See supra notes 267-273, 396-402, 412-416 and 446-448 and accompanying text. 
 465. See supra notes 239-278 and accompanying text. Justice O’Connor, the Justice who 
expressed the greatest concern with the length of a retroactive tax statute in Carlton, stated that what 
troubled her was the prospect of a legislature acting to “readjust rights and burdens . . . and upset 
otherwise settled expectations.”  Carlton, 512 U.S. at 37 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  In a case decided 
two years before Carlton she wrote the Court’s majority opinion upholding a retroactive state economic 
statute reversing a court case where the statute’s actual retroactive impact on two companies dated back 
six years.  See General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181 (1992).  In that case, which Justice 
O’Connor later cited in her concurrence in Carlton, 512 U.S. at 36, she concluded that “legitimate 
expectations and settled transactions” were not upset, because only the two companies — and not the 
business community more generally — had previously understood the law to be as ultimately construed 
by the court decision that the legislature then reversed.  503 U.S. at 191. The state tax cases discussed in 
this article generally reflect similar facts.  Romein is discussed in more detail supra notes 281-301 and 
accompanying text. 
 466. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.  
 467. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
65
Fatale: Connecting the Dot: Retroactive State Tax Statutes Revisit United
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
98 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86 
it is inequitable.468  Carlton noted that taxpayers have no vested right in 
tax legislation and a judicial interpretation of such legislation confers no 
additional rights — other than with respect to a taxpayer that has 




 468. See supra notes 131-134 and accompanying text. 
 469. See supra notes 119, 213-217 and 402 and accompanying text. 
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